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"THE VERY STEREOTYPE
THE LAW CONDEMNS":t
CONSTITUTIONAL SEX DISCRIMINATIONtt
LAW AS A QUEST FOR PERFECT PROXIES
Mary Anne Caset
In his lone dissent from the Supreme Court's decision holding
the Virginia Military Institute's exclusion of women unconstitutional,
Justice Scalia worked up to yet another fever pitch of outrage at what
he perceived as the majority's unprincipled departure from estab-
lished doctrine. According to an indignant Justice Scalia:
[T]he Court proceeds to interpret "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion" in a fashion that contradicts the reasoning of . . . other
precedents.
t J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 138 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)).
"- For reasons set forth more fully in Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Genderfrom Sex
and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and FeministJurisprudene, 105 YALE L.
1, 2-4, 9-13 (1995), I shall throughout this article use the term "sex discrimination" to refer
to discrimination between males and females and reserve the term "gender discrimination"
to refer to discrimination on the basis of qualities coded as masculine or feminine, whether
the person exhibiting those qualities is male or female. For reasons set forth more fully
below, I shall generally use the term "discrimination" in its technical sense of "making a
distinction." Thus, not all sex discrimination in the law (i.e., not all distinctions made in
the law on the basis of sex) will necessarily be unconstitutional. Nor will every denial of
equal protection to persons on account of their sex necessarily result from sex
discrimination. As I shall further explain, because the Supreme Court's inquiries into the
denial of equal protection on grounds of sex have focused quite narrowly on deprivations
caused by rules that, on their face, distinguish between males and females (i.e., sex-
respecting rules), it is no accident that I refer to the law of sex discrimination, rather than
say, of sex equality.
$ Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Versions of this Article were
presented at the University of Chicago, New York University, Ohio State University, Quin-
nipiac College, the University of Virginia and Washington and Lee University; and at the
UCLA Colloquium on Justice, the New York Area Feminist Law Teachers Works-in-Pro-
gress Group, and a Federalist Society debate with Virginia Military Institute's counsel Ted
Olson. I am grateful to participants in those events, particularly Sylvia Law, Mary Becker,
Brian Bix, Jennifer Brown, Jim Brudney, Ruth Colker, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Chris Eisgruber,
Martha Fineman, Louis Halper, Frances Kamm, Larry Kramer, Carlin Meyer, David Millon,
Burt Neuborne, Eric Posner, Judith Resnick, Joan Shaughnessy, Seana Shiffrin, Peter
Swire, Mary Moers Winig, and Diane Zimmerman, as well as to Alex Aleinikoff, Dianne
Avery, Ed Baker, Jack Balkin, Emily Buss, John Harrison, Dick Howard, Pam Karlan, Mike
Klarman, David Martin, Chuck McCurdy, Steve Newhouse, Dan Ortiz, Tod Preuss, Mike
Seidman, David Strauss, Cass Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule, Rip Verkerke, Val Vojdik, Ted
White; research assistants Toby Heytens, Allyson Newton, David Ravicher, and Liz Tucci;
members of my 1996 class in Regulating Family, Sex and Gender, and Si Bunting, Mike
Strickler, and Chuck Steenbergen of VMI.
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That is essential to the Court's result, which can only be
achieved by establishing that intermediate scrutiny is not survived if
there are some women interested in attending VMI, capable of un-
dertaking its activities, and able to meet its physical demands.
Only the amorphous "exceedingly persuasive justification"
phrase, and not the standard elaboration of intermediate scrutiny,
can be made to yield this conclusion that VMI's single-sex composi-
tion is unconstitutional because there exist several women (or, one
would have to conclude under the Court's reasoning, a single
woman) willing and able to undertake VMI's program.... There is
simply no support in our cases for the notion that a sex-based classi-
fication is invalid unless it relates to characteristics that hold true in
every instance.1
The view that U.S. v. Virginia ("VMJ") is a departure from prece-
dent and that the standard it articulates is "amorphous" is not unique
to Justice Scalia, or even to critics of the decision. A variety of com-
mentators have seen new promise in the decision. For example, Cass
Sunstein, who speaks well of the VM! decision, also characterizes it as
unsettling the constitutional law of sex discrimination, changing the
test, "heighten [ing] the level of scrutiny and bring [ing] it closer to...
'strict scrutiny.' 2 Sunstein puts VM! in a category of "narrow,"
"deeply reasoned" decisions he calls "the most rule-free" of all the de-
cision categories he describes.3
This Article will demonstrate that Justice Scalia is quite right in
his articulation of the standard applied by the majority in VMJ, but
wrong to assert that it is a departure of any kind from precedent.4
Cass Sunstein is also wrong to suggest that "[aifter United States v. Vir-
ginia, it is not simple to describe the appropriate standard of review"5
and to view the VMT decision as in any way "rule-free" or an example
of even a limited move "in the direction of open-ended balancing."6
V-MI instead marks yet another application of the rule that has
governed constitutional sex discrimination cases since the early 1970s,
a rule quite "simple to articulate" and applied in a way that might
satisfy the most rigid of formalists, but one often lurking, as common
1 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 572-74 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2 Cass K Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. Rgv. 4, 73 (1996).
3 Id. at 23-26.
4 Fortunately, not all interpreters of the decision have made Scalia's mistake. See
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 179, 183 & n.22 (1st Cir. 1996) (correctly describing
the current law as focused on the condemnation of "discrimination based upon 'archaic
and overbroad generalizations' about women" and noting that VMI "adds nothing to the
analysis of equal protection challenges to gender-based classifications that has not been
part of that analysis since 1979" (citations omitted)).
5 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 75.
6 Id. at 78.
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law rules7 sometimes do, just below the surface of the decisions apply-
ing it. It is my contention that the components of the intermediate
scrutiny standard-a practice "substantially related to an important
governmental objective"-have rarely been the moving parts8 in a
Supreme Court sex discrimination decision. 9 Rather, the bulk of the
work in these decisions has been done by what readers of the opinions
may be tempted to treat as mere decorative rhetorical flourish-the
proposition that there are constitutional objections to "gross, stereo-
typed distinctions between the sexes,"' 0 that is to say, to "classifications
based on sex ... premised on overbroad generalizations."" To deter-
mine whether there is unconstitutional sex discrimination, one need
generally ask only two questions: 1) Is the rule or practice at issue sex-
respecting, that is to say, does it distinguish on its face between males
and females?12 and 2) Does the sex-respecting rule rely on a
stereotype?
In the constitutional, just as in the statutory, law of sex discrimi-
nation, "stereotype" has become a term of art by which is simply
meant any imperfect proxy, any overbroad generalization. For a sex-
respecting rule to withstand constitutional scrutiny by the Court, it
seems to be at least necessary and usually sufficient that it embody
some perfect proxy.'3 That is to say, the assumption at the root of the
sex-respecting rule must be true of either all women or no women or
7 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 877,
879 (1996); infra text accompanying notes 134-46.
8 As Sylvia Law put it in commentary on this paper at an N.Y.U. workshop, the "em-
peror" of equal protection law is generally seen to have three garments: red for stop, yellow
for caution, and green for go-equivalent to strict, intermediate, and rational basis scru-
tiny. In questioning this conventional wisdom, I am not suggesting that the emperor has
no clothes, instead I am suggesting that what may generally have been seen as a fluid
yellow garment is instead more akin to a rigid suit of armor-it is a rule, not a standard.
9 The single exception may be Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984), discussed
infra note 59. Additionally, Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228 (1979), directed that, on remand, "inquiry... be undertaken into what 'impor-
tant governmental objectives,' if any, are served by the gender-based employment of con-
gressional staff" but neither undertook such an inquiry nor "express [ed any] views as to
[its] outcome." 442 U.S. at 235 n.9 (citations omitted).
10 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
11 Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507 (1975).
12 Of course, in theory, a "No" answer does not end the inquiry. Instead, it triggers
inquiry into constitutional disparate impact, with the next set of questions being the follow-
ing. (a) Does the practice have a disparate impact on one sex?, and (b) If yes, was the
practice adopted "because of, and not in spite of" this diparate impact? See Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). Notoriously, however, as will be discussed in detail
below, in practice the Court has seen only sex-respecting rules as denying equality on
grounds of sex.
13 I do not claim that this is a startlingly original discovery which has completely es-
caped the notice of the many able commentators on the constitutional dimensions of sex
equality. But, especially given reactions lke those above cited to VMI, I do think it worth-
while to set forth the parameters of this rule more explicitly and fully than has yet been
done by either courts or commentators.
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all men or no men; there must be a zero or a hundred on one side of
the sex equation or the other.14 Even a generalization demonstrably
true of an overwhelming majority of one sex or the other does not
suffice to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality the Court
has attached to sex-respecting rules: virtually every sex-respecting rule
struck down by the Court in the last quarter century embodied a
proxy that was overwhelmingly, though not perfectly, accurate. 15
Moreover, overbreadth alone seems to be enough to doom a sex-re-
specting rule. This is so even though many of the generalizations em-
bodied in sex-respecting rules struck down by the Court are not only
overbroad but also "archaic." That is to say, that as well as being de-
scriptively less than perfectly accurate, these generalizations also em-
body outdated normative stereotypes (i.e., "fixed notions concerning
the roles and abilities of males and females"' 6 or "the accidental by-
product of a traditional way of thinking about females"17).
On this view of the law, as I shall discuss, VMJ is an extremely easy
case, the logical culmination of a long line of cases rather than any
sort of new beginning. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, author of the
majority opinion, stands at both ends of this line, now able to affirm as
a Justice what she first argued as an advocate. All of the moving parts
of the present law are fully articulated in her brief for the appellant in
Reed v. Reed,'8 although it took until the second modern constitutional
sex discrimination case, Frontiero v. Richardson,19 which Ginsburg ar-
gued for the ACLU as amicus curiae, for members of the Court explic-
itly to adopt them.
I do not mean to suggest that modern constitutional sex discrimi-
nation law sprang full grown from the head of Ruth Bader Ginsburg
like Athena from the head of Zeus.20 Not only were many other advo-
14 This should have been the test for sex-respecting rules under the Equal Rights
Amendment, according to an influential 1971 article on the meaning of the ERA. See
Barbara A. Brown, Thomas I. Emerson, Gail Falk & Ann E. Freedman, The Equal Rights
Amendment: A Constitutional Basisfor Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 893 (1971).
15 Thus, for example, in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), though Justice Brennan
tried to play games with the math in his majority opinion, more than 90% of those teenag-
ers arrested in Oklahoma for driving while intoxicated were male. See id. at 200 n.8. In
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), the evidence indicated that approximately 90% of
women and 3% of men in the relevant pool were dependent on their spouses. See id. at
238-39 n.7 (RehnquistJ., dissenting). These figures are representative, not extraordinary.
The exceptions involve proxies, such as those behind sex-based peremptory challenges to
jurors, whose accuracy cannot readily be measured.
16 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
17 Califano, 430 U.S. at 223 (Stevens, J., concurring).
18 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
19 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
20 If it had, of course, the law would be importantly different, and much more expan-
sive. For example, Ginsburg has long argued that laws concerning abortion and pregancy
should be seen as implicating sex equality, although the Court expressly rejected the latter
view in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974), and has largely ignored it in abor-
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cates and theorists involved in shaping the arguments presented to
the Court and to the nation, the Court's view of sex discrimination
was strongly shaped by what went "[b] efore, behind, between, above,
below."2' Three main influences-the developing law of sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;22 the Court's
own past decisions in early, discredited sex and race cases; and its con-
temporaneous obsession with closely examining all irrebuttable pre-
sumptions-primed the Court to formulate the law as it did. As I shall
attempt to demonstrate, constitutional sex discrimination law is in
many ways path dependent on Title VII, which since 1964 has out-
lawed discrimination in employment on the basis of sex. Title VII
made an explicit textual commitment to a "sameness," or anti-discrim-
ination, approach. 23 And, under the rubric of bona fide occupational
qualification ("BFOQ"), which is the single justification under the
statute for discrimination on the basis of sex, there developed an anti-
stereotyping jurisprudence that centered on a search for perfect prox-
ies. 24 As the Court began seriously to consider questions of sex dis-
crimination under the Constitution, it saw that the very sort of
stereotyping now prohibited by Title VII was the basis for earlier con-
stitutional decisions such as Justice Bradley's concurrence in Bradwell
v. Illinois,25 which denied employment opportunities to women on the
basis of sex;26 it rejected stereotypes in rejectingJustice Bradley's opin-
ion.27 Finally, the current constitutional law of sex discrimination
crystallized in that narrow window of time during which a majority of
the Court seemed disposed to take seriously the notion that there was
something constitutionally problematic about any irrebuttable pre-
sumption, any failure to make room for individual exceptions to gen-
eral rules, whatever the characteristic on which such rules were
based. 28 Thus the justices to whom Ginsburg first presented her argu-
tion cases. In addition to briefing the losing side in Geduldig, Ginsburg argued the losing
side in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). She might well also be generally more sympa-
thetic to claims of disparate impact by sex.
21 JoHN DoNNm, ELEGY XIX, To His MSiSmS GOING TO BED (1669), reprinted inJoHN
DoNNE's Pozrra, 62 L26 (Arthur L. Clements ed., W.W. Norton 1992).
22 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (1994).
23 Id.
24 The outlines of Title VII stereotyping jurisprudence are set forth in Case, supra
note tt, at 36-41.
25 83 U.S. 16 Wall. 130 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
26 See id. at 135 (Bradley, J., concurring).
27 See id. at 140-42.
28 As I will discuss in detail below, the heyday of the Court's willingness to see consti-
tutional problems with irrebuttable presumptions of all kinds extended from the mid-
1960s to 1975. See discussion infra Part III.C. By the time Justice Rehnquist's opinion for
the majority in Weinberger v. Salf, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), killed the move toward mandating
individual determinations or perfect accuracy in all sorts of classification, the current con-
stitutional law of sex discrimination, with its anti-stereotyping core, was already firmly in
place. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
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ments were a receptive audience to the extent they were impelled by
Tide VII's prohibition of sex-stereotyping, repelled by their predeces-
sors' reliance on stereotypes, and surrounded by doubts about all reli-
ance on any overbroad generalizations.
Nor do I mean to suggest that VMT is merely a dead end for the
law. Rather, as I shall discuss, taking its anti-stereotyping message seri-
ously would lead the laws governing men and women, particularly as
sex and marriage partners and as mothers and fathers, in interesting
and radical directions. The decision also highlights the growing dis-
parity between the Court's treatment of race and sex in matters involv-
ing the relationship between stereotyping and affirmative action.
Before hypothesizing further about where the constitutional rule
against sex-stereotyping came from and what it may mean for the fu-
ture adjudication of constitutional questions of sex discrimination and
sex equality, let me try to explain how the rule differs from a more
conventional application of heightened scrutiny and how the rule is
articulated and applied in Supreme Court cases over the past quarter
century.
I
PERFECT PROXIES vs. NARROW TAILORING:
COMPARING THE REQUIREMENTS
Perhaps the best way of illustrating the difference in the require-
ments of the prohibition on stereotyping on the one hand and con-
ventional heightened scrutiny on the other is by applying both tests to
the facts of the case generally recognized as the first major step toward
the construction of today's tiers of scrutiny, Korematsu v. United States.29
Infamously, the Court in Korematsu subjected an order banning those
ofJapanese ancestry from their homes on the West Coast to "the most
rigid scrutiny"3 0 and nevertheless upheld the order.31 Korematsu is
particularly useful as an illustration because it is one of the few race
cases in which race is clearly being used as a proxy, specifically, for
loyalty to the United States.3 2
If the perfect proxy test is applied to the order in Korematsu, it
clearly fails the test. The order at issue is clearly both over- and under-
inclusive. On neither side of the equation does it embody a perfect
proxy since there are concededly both loyal Japanese-Americans and
29 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
30 Id. at 216.
31 See id. at 219.
32 Indeed, the very fact that race is being used as a proxy, however imperfect, is what
may save its use in the opinion of the Korematsu majority, because this suggests to them that
the rule is not the result of "antagonism" or "racial prejudice." Id. at 223. In the bulk of
the race cases, perhaps the most pernicious thing of all about the classification is that race
itself is the characteristic at which the law aims. Of this, more later.
1452 [Vol. 85:1447
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disloyal non-Japanese. The difference between this test and the con-
ventional test of strict scrutiny-namely, whether the order is narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest-is the differ-
ence between attention to false positives and false negatives. Whereas
the perfect proxy rule asks whether there are any non-traitorous Japa-
nese-Americans and would use a "yes" answer to strike down the rule,
avoiding false positives, conventional strict scrutiny, having established
that the exclusion of Japanese traitors during a war with Japan is a
compelling interest, would instead ask whether there is any rule more
narrowly tailored than the exclusion order at issue that would exclude
all traitorous Japanese. It seeks to avoid false negatives, but by the
least restrictive means. Since there may well be no more narrowly tai-
lored rule that would serve, some rules that might fail the perfect
proxy test could nevertheless survive strict scrutiny.33 This is in fact
what happened in Korematsu, where the majority acknowledged that,
"[i]t was because we could not reject the finding of the military au-
thorities that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segrega-
tion of the disloyal from the loyal that we sustained the validity of the
... order as applying to the whole group."3 4
Among many other things, Korematsu may demonstrate how very
malleable conventional heightened scrutiny is to judicial manipula-
tion. More importantly, the comparison of the two standards suggests
that those commentators who see the standard applied in VAM! as
more exacting than that set forth in the conventional formulation of
intermediate scrutiny may be on to something, but this more exacting
standard is nothing new. The perfect proxy test has always had the
capacity to be more strict even than strict scrutiny. One reason this
may not have been obvious in the past may be that, for decades, very
few of the race cases to which strict scrutiny was applied involved the
use of race as any sort of proxy.3 5 Instead, perhaps the most perni-
33 Far from viewing this result as anomalous, many of the litigators and commentators
who paved the way for today's constitutional law of sex discrmination have affirmatively
endorsed it. For example, the authors of an influential Yale Law Journal article on the
Equal Rights Amendment argued that strict scrutiny for sex classifications, even if available
in court, would not be enough to guarantee equality: "[B]ecause this doctrine allows the
government to justify even a suspect classification by 'compelling reasons,' it would permit
some classifications based on sex to survive. Thus this standard too would not guarantee
an effective system of equality which, as we shall argue, demands the elimination of all such
classifications." Brown et al., supra note 14, at 880-81 (footnote omitted).
34 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219 (discussing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943), which upheld a similar order imposing a curfew on those ofJapanese ancestry).
35 Note, however, that one form of massive resistance to Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), was the attempt to reimpose segregated schools by alleging race as a
proxy for intellectual ability. See Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 355 F.2d
865, 866 (5th Cir. 1966) (insisting on nonracial assignment of children notwithstanding
"voluminous testimony [offered] to show that allegedly innate racial differences furnish a
reasonable basis for classifying school children according to race and therefore justify con-
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cious aspect of the racial classifications at issue in cases from Brown to
Loving v. Virginia 6 was that race was being used for its own sake.3 7
Now we are entering an era in which the bulk of the race cases
reaching the Court can be characterized as using race as a proxy-for
disadvantage or diversity in the affirmative action cases,38 or for com-
munity of interest in the voting rights cases-and once again the lan-
guage of perfect proxy is asserting itself. This could lead to a
convergence of standards for race and sex, even though there is disa-
greement on the Court about the form that convergence should take.
Thus, though the view of liberal justices that intermediate scrutiny
should govern "benign" racial classifications has been rejected,3 9 lan-
tinued segregation ... based on [inter alia] the disparity in intelligence and achievement
between Negro and white pupils"). As, later, with sex, the attempt to use imperfect proxies
to bolster race prejudice was found unconstitutional. In arguments identical to those
made by opponents of sex discrimination, Thurgood Marshall insisted to the Supreme
Court during the Brown remedy argument:
'They give tests to grade children so what do we think is the solution?
Simple. Put the dumb colored children in with the dumb white children,
and put the smart colored children with the smart white children ....
[T]here are geniuses in both groups and there are lower ones in both
groups, and it has no bearing. No right of an individual can be condi-
tioned as to any average of other people in his racial group or any other
group.'
MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME
COURT, 1936-1961 225 (1994) (quoting Thurgood Marshall's oral argument before the
Supreme Court for the remedy portion of Brown).
36 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
37 Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding Colorado's Amendment
Two unconstitutional because "it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake,
something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit").
38 Note that even the partial dissent in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978), specifically urged the adoption of "considerations... developed in gen-
der-discrimination cases" for allegedly benign race-based classifications. Id. at 359-60
(Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
39 See Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 222-27 (1995). The Adarand deci-
sion results in what some, see, e.g., id. at 242 (Stevens,J, dissenting), consider an anomaly-
if racial affirmative action is judged under strict scrutiny and sex-based affirmative action
under intermediate scrutiny, sex-based programs may be upheld when identical race-based
programs will be struck down. It is my guess that this potential anomaly, together with the
Court's simultaneous assertion that "strict in theory" should no longer be taken to mean
"fatal in fact," see id. at 237, was one of the factors that led the United States in VMI to
switch, at the last minute, to a claim that strict scrutiny should govern sex classifications.
Another factor may well be the presence on the Court ofJustice Ginsburg, who has sup-
ported strict scrutiny for sex since her brief in Reed See supra notes 18-20 and accompany-
ing text. Of course, not all would see this situation as anomalous or troubling.
Counterposed to the view that the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted above all
to help blacks, including by preferential programs, is the view that the Amendment should
be interpreted to see all racial classifications, but not necessarily any other form of classifi-
cation, as inherently pernicious.
As I shall explain below, to date the Court's application of the perfect proxy rule is
consistent with easy approval of many sex-based affirmative action programs, if, as the
Court seems to have done, one views all women, even those not demonstrably materially
affected by it, as subject to ambient discrimination on the basis of their sex. This leads to
[Vol. 85:14471454
CONSTITUTIONAL SEX DISCRIMINATION
guage in the voting rights cases suggests that the conservatives on the
court may insist that race be used as a proxy for community of interest
only when it is a perfect proxy.40
Interestingly, there is a sense in which VMT could have been a
much more difficult case to fit under the perfect proxy, anti-stereotyp-
ing rubric: VMI was not really using sex as a proxy for anything; it was
maleness itself in which the school was interested. What really mat-
tered to VMI was its cult of masculinity in a world sealed from the
presence of women who might either meet or undermine the mascu-
line standard, in each case threatening male privilege. In some re-
spects, this makes VMT an even easier case, because it then begins to
look more like the many race cases from Plessy v. Ferguson41 through
Brown and Loving, in which race also was not really used as a proxy for
anything, it was the thing itself that the legislators were after. In that
event, it is far more difficult to argue that a legitimate governmental
interest could be served thereby: just as it was a case of preserving
white supremacy in Loving, it was a case of preserving male supremacy
in VWl and Virgina's lack of concern for its daughters in VMis paral-
leled by its lack of concern about race mixtures among the "inferior"
races in Loving.42
The analogy between VM and the early race cases extends be-
yond doctrine to history and sociology. What is going on at VMI is
very dose to what happened in the South more generally in the era of
segregation and massive resistance-the fear of contamination by a
group. VMI's student population is by and large a hard scrabble
group, fairly poor, and with low SAT scores; they are clinging to male
the paradox that the quest for perfect proxies, while animating both race and sex based
affirmative action analysis, has led to diametrically opposed results in the two areas, be-
cause in the sex cases, but emphatically not in the race cases, the Court has been willing to
accept that all members of the disadvantaged group were subject to discrimination. What
may help account for the persistence of this paradox is that, because the sex-based affirma-
tive action blessed by the Court is closely associated with dejure exclusion of women from
job opportunities (for example, federal regulations excluding women from combat posi-
tions in the military), the perfection of the proxy (i.e., the absence of an exception to the
exclusion) may be more easily shown for sex than it can be in the case of race, where, at
least since the fall of Jim Crow, exclusion based on race is not de jure and thus not as
demonstrably categorical.
40 See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 967-69 (1996) (plurality opinion) (condemning
as "unjustified racial stereotyping" by government actors the use of race as "a proxy for
political characteristics," notwithstanding evidence that 97% of black voters in the district
were Democratic voters).
41 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42 The statute at issue in Loving did not involve a perfectly parallel treatment of the
races. Instead, the statute only prohibited "whites from marrying any nonwhite (subject to
the exception for the descendants of Pocahontas), [while] Negroes, Orientals, and any
other racial class may intermarry without statutory interference." 388 U.S. 1, 11 n.11
(1967). This made white supremacy, rather than racial purity more generally, the obvious
purpose of the statute.
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privilege because it's all they have.43 The admission of women to VMI
can also be predicted to have some of the -same effects as the admis-
sion of blacks. For example, hierarchy works differently in a cross-race
or cross-sex context. Whether it be a black man giving orders to a
white man in the 60s South, or a white man insulting a black man in
the way superior officers are meant to insult entering freshman at
VMI, the introduction of culturally coded racial differences disturbs
the illusion of equality in sameness on which VMI claims to rely.44 As
Justice Breyer indicated at the oral argument of VM, the exclusion of
blacks could be justified in much the same terms as VMI used to try to
justify the exclusion of women.45
In choosing to litigate the case as involving maleness as a proxy
for both interest and ability,46 VMI made a decision that, whatever its
temporary success in the benighted Fourth Circuit, was bound to fail
when set squarely against Supreme Court precedent. According to
the District Court, its findings of fact were proof that the establish-
ment of an all-male VMI and an all-female VWIL47 rested on real dif-
43 Cf Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Pro-
duction and Race Discrimination, 108 HAv. L. REv. 1003, 1008 (1995) (presenting the con-
tention that "because of concern for status, cooperation arises within groups and conflict
occurs between groups").
44 See generally Dianne Avery, Institutional Myths, Historical Narratives and Social Science
Evidence: Reading the "Record" in the Virginia Military Institute Case, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. & Wo-
MEN'S STUn. 189 (1996) (exploring the history of the Virginia Military Institute and the
litigation concerning it).
45 See Oral Argument at 50-52, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (No. 94-
1941). Although the transcript does not identify the speaker, I was personally present at
the oral argument and observed Justice Breyer make this comment.
46 What at first glance may seem a stronger argument-that the exclusion of women
is a proxy for the exclusion of sexual tension between cadets, is strongly undercut by an
amazing and little-known fact about VMI, one that, to the best of my knowledge, never
made it into the record of the case: according to its officials, VMI does not discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation. VMI's officials repeatedly assured me over a period of years
that they not only did not ask, they would not care if applicants or cadets told, about
homosexual inclinations. (They added that homosexual conduct in the barracks was pro-
hibited and that there were, as far as they knew, no homosexuals at VMI.) Given that
VMI's announced purpose is to train "citizen-soldiers" and that the U.S. military still does
discriminate against homosexuals, VMI's policy may seem particularly bizarre. But to me,
it is conclusive evidence that what VMI fears is not sexual tension, but women, pure and
simple. In remarking how sad he was to see VMI change, the Superintendent of VMI
recently spoke of having the strains of Gustav Mahler's score to the movie adaptation of
Thomas Mann's Death in Venice in the back of his mind as he looked out over the campus in
its final all-male days. This anecdote adds a peculiar flavor to the homoerotic overtones of
VMI, given that, of course, Death in Venice is the story of an aging repressed homosexual in
a dying city lusting after beautiful young men. SeeJeffrey Rosen, Like Race, Like Gender?,
NEw REPUBuC, Feb. 19, 1996, at 21, 24.
47 The Virginia Women in Leadership Program ("VWIL") at Mary Baldwin College, a
private, all-female college near VMI, was VMI's response to the Fourth Circuit's order that
it either admit women, go private, or establish an alternative program for women. See
United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 900 (4th Cir. 1992), vacating, 766 F. Supp. 1407
(W.D. Va. 1991).
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ferences between the sexes, and not on stereotypes. But precisely
what the District Court found as a matter of fact not to be a stereo-
type, conclusively proved as a matter of law that stereotypes were the
basis of the sex distinctions in the case. None of the many facts as to
ability or inclination of males and females was categorical. In each
case the most that was claimed was that the findings were true of the
vast majority of one or the other sex. But, as Justice Ginsburg noted,
what the constitutional law of sex discrimination teaches unequivo-
cally is that "generalizations about 'the way women are,' ... no longer
justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place
them outside the average description."48
II
FINDING PERFECT PROXIES IN SUPREME COURT SEX
DISCmwNATION CASES
In arguing that the rule of decision in constitutional sex discrimi-
nation cases has been that of the perfect proxy as described above, I
do not mean to indicate endorsement of this rule. Not only do I ques-
tion whether our concerns about sex equality are appropriately cir-
cumscribed by an inquiry only into the closeness of fit of sex-
respecting rules, it also seems to me, as it has to many other commen-
tators, that at least some of the perfect proxies found by the Court in
upholding sex-respecting rules since the early 1970s are specious.49
My claim that post-Frontiero constitutional sex discrimination cases can
be explained by reference to such a rule is a descriptive one, although
I address some of its normative implications. Descriptively, while I do
not claim that the perfect proxies the Court found are good ones, I do
claim (1) that the majority found a perfect proxy in every sex-respect-
ing rule the Court upheld since Frontiero, and (2) for every sex-respect-
ing rule struck down since Frontiero, no perfect proxy, even a
farfetched one, occurred to the court, or to me.50
In the years since Frontiero, the case in which the Court first ex-
pressly noted constitutional opposition to sex-stereotyping, the Court
has examined approximately two dozen sex-respecting rules for con-
stitutionality and upheld only about a half dozen. In some of these,
the perfect proxy identified was created by another sex-respecting rule
48 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 517 (1996).
49 Most obviously, both the law at issue in Michael M. v. Superior Cour 450 U.S. 464
(1981), and the court opinions uphholding it, discussed below, rest on stereotypes, as dis-
senting justices and commentators have made clear. See, e.g., id. at 489 n.2 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and
Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 175, 186 (1982).
50 All this does not answer several questions. For example, even if a perfect proxy is
necessary, as I hope to demonstrate it has been and will be, is it always sufficient? No case
to date has tested this question.
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whose constitutionality was not before the court; another group in-
volved enduring "[p]hysical differences between men and women"51
and, in the third group, "[s] ex classifications [were] ... used to com-
pensate women 'for particular economic disabilities [they have]
suffered."' 5 2
Perhaps most notorious is the perfect proxy identified by the plu-
rality in Michael M. v. Superior Court,53 upholding California's statutory
rape law, which criminalized exclusively sexual intercourse with fe-
males under the age of eighteen. The statute at issue in Michael M.
was in several ways a sex-respecting rule: as the California Supreme
Court held, it "discriminates on the basis of sex because only females
may be victims, and only males may violate the section. '5 4 For the
California Supreme Court, as for the Supreme Court plurality, both
halves of this sex distinction rested on a perfect proxy, and hence, the
sex distinction embodied in the law was constitutionally permissible.
As Justice Rehnquist noted in summarizing the lower court opinion
with approval, "the classification was 'supported not by mere social
convention but by the immutable physiological fact that it is the fe-
male exclusively who can become pregnant.' 5 Moreover, "males
alone can 'physiologically cause the result which the law properly
seeks to avoid,' . .. [so] the gender classification was readily justified
as a means of identifying offender and victim." 56 Whatever one may
think about the archaic nature ofJustice Rehnquist's foray into repro-
ductive biology, which conjures up Aristotelian images of homunculi
in sperm as well as reinforcing stereotypical notions of female passivity
and male activity in sex, he got from it the prefect proxy he seemed to
think he needed.57
51 VMJ, 518 U.S. at 533. This group includes not only Michael M., but also Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979). In Parham, the sex-respecting rule distinguished between the
rights of fathers and mothers of illegitimate children not only on the basis of reproductive
biology, but also, as with the second group of cases, on the basis of other statutes not
before the Court, such as those providing fathers of illegitimate children the opportunity
to seek orders of filiation. See id. Wendy Williams has criticized this as the "'one discrimi-
nation justifies another' approach." Williams, supra note 49, at 182 n.50.
52 VMT, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977)). The
quotations in the text are taken from that portion of the Vff opinion in which Justice
Ginsburg acknowledged that the "heightened review standard our precedent establishes
does not make sex a proscribed classification" and set forth the permissible uses of sex as a
classification. Id.
53 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
54 Id. at 467 (quoting Michael M. v. Superior Court, 601 P.2d 572, 574 (Cal. 1980),
affd, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55 Id. (quoting Michael M., 601 P.2d at 574).
56 Id.
57 Justice Stevens, the Justice most alive to the problem of stereotypes that are
"archaic" and not merely overbroad, described as an unsupported assumption perhaps
reflecting "nothing more than an irrational prejudice," the assumption that "the decision
to engage in risk creating conduct is always-or at least typically-a male decision." Id. at
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The second group of perfect proxies are no more normatively
satisfying. Although, as I have noted, Justice Bradley's concurrence in
Bradwell has become the Court's favorite example of what was wrong
with earlier views of relations between the sexes, the one aspect of
Justice Bradley's opinion that has not been rejected by the modem
Court is the notion that one sex discriminatory law can be justified by
reference to others not before the court. Just as the legal disabilities
of a regime of coverture were used by Justice Bradley to justify
Bradwell's exclusion from the bar, so women's exclusion from combat
justified both the extra time given women to achieve promotion,58
and women's exclusion from military registration. 59 And, notwith-
standing that the number of women eligible for veterans' preferences
in Massachusetts was kept infinitessimally low6° by "the variety of fed-
eral statutes, regulations, and policies that have restricted the number
of women who could enlist in the United States Armed Forces, and...
501 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Cf. Territory v. Armstrong, 28 Haw. 88, 95 (1924) (upholding
against equal protection challenge higher penalties for male than for female adulterers on
grounds, inter alia, that women already run the risk of pregnancy and social ostracism, that
men are more often "the agressor, [or] 'hunter,'" and that family members should be
encouraged to bring charges without fear that women would bear the brunt of
punishment).
58 See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
59 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728
(1984), also involved reference over to another sex-respecting rule, but, unlike the combat
exclusions at issue in Ballard and Rosther, the sex-respecting rule behind the one at issue in
Heckler not only had been before the Court, but had been held unconstitutional. The law
at issue in Hecder makes no mention of sex on its face, it merely incorporates by reference
another subsection of the Social Security law "as it was in effect and being administered in
January 1977." Id. at 733 (internal quotation marks omitted). Precisely that subsection,
requiring proof of dependency from husbands but not from wives, was struck down as
discriminatory in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), early in 1977. See id. To protect
those persons, most of them women, who had relied on the law struck down in Goldfarb in
planning their retirement, Congress enacted a five-year-transition-period exemption from
a substitute, sex-neutral rule that would require no proof of dependency, but would re-
quire an offset of spousal pensions. See Heckler, 465 U.S. at 732-34. Congress further pro-
vided that the transition rule could not be extended to persons, like Mathews, whose
retirement took place outside the protected period; instead, if the rule were successfully
challenged, those within the window would lose their exemption. See id. Although I am
prepared to consider Heckler as that rare case in which, not the perfect proxy rule, but
instead conventional intermediate scrutiny, is doing the work, I do note that the opinion
by Justice Brennan described the rule as
distinguish[ing] social security applicants, not according to archaic general-
izations about the roles and abilities of men and women, but rather accord-
ing to whether they planned their retirement with the expectation, created
by the law in effect in January 1977, that they would receive both full
spousal benefits and a government pension.
Id. at 730.
60 "[O]ver 98% of the veterans in Massachusetts were male." Personnel Adm'r v. Fee-
ney, 442 U.S. 256, 270 (1979). No women (except for those passing as men) were given
full military rank until the early twentieth century, and, until 1967, a statutory quota kept
women at no more than 2% of enlisted strength. See id. at 269 n.21. Women were less than
5% of the military at the time of the Feeney litigation. See id.
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the simple fact that women have never been subject to a military
draft,"6' the Court in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney upheld an abso-
lute preference for veterans whose effect was admittedly to keep quali-
fied women out of the upper echelons of the Massachusetts Civil
Service.62 Thus, the combat exclusion is used to justify both a "bene-
fit" to women (longer time), and women's exemption from the "bur-
den" of draft registration. But, note, of course, that the net result to
women includes the resulting deprivation, not only of concrete oppor-
tunity as in Feeney, but also of citizenship value, inclusion, and respect.
The most interesting group of cases in which a sex-respecting
rule was upheld are those in which the purpose of the rule is seen to
be to compensate women for discrimination against them as a sex.
This group includes Ballard, Califano v. Webster63 and Kahn v. Shevin.64
To see how sex can serve as a proxy for discrimination in these cases,
it is best to begin with Ballard. In this case women were given longer
than men to demonstrate their promotability under an "up or out"
military regime that mandated discharge for those not promoted
within a set time. The justification given was, once again, women's
exclusion from combat positions, in which promotability could be
demonstrated far more readily. The fact that, notwithstanding the
combat exclusion, some women could and did get promoted in the
time allowed men did not mean that the proxy was imperfect, because
the exclusion still affected all women, even those who by extraordi-
nary effort, luck, or skill managed to overcome its handicap. Simi-
larly, if a rule says a woman must be twice as good as a man to be
promoted, and she is twice as good, the discriminatory rule will not
have changed the outcome in her case, but she will still not have been
exempt from the application of the rule. 65 With this structure of anal-
ysis in mind, it becomes easier to see how even the rule in Kahn,66
61 Id. at 269-70.
62 See id. So-called "women's requisitions" (of the lower echelon, clerical variety) were
initially excluded by law from the veterans preference and, by the time of Feeney, were the
sort of "lower paying positions for which males traditionally had not applied." Id. at 270 &
n.22.
63 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (allowing women wage earners to exclude three more low
earning years than men in the computation of the base from which Social Security benefits
were calculated).
64 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding the granting to widows but not widowers of an
annual $500 property-tax exemption).
65 Compare the 1991 Amendments to Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, which for the first time gave a cause of action to victims of discrimi-
nation even if no employment outcome in their case was altered by the discrimination.
These amendments may provide some acknowledgment that the burden of having to be
twice as good is a difficult and unjust one, even to those who can meet it.
66 Most commentators see Kahn as an outlier, an aberration, an early mistake made
on the Court's way to shaping current sex discrimination doctrine. It is also one of Gins-
burg's few losses before the Court. In her brief, quoting Sarah Grimke, Ginsburg insisted
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which gave a $500 annual property tax exemption to widows, but not
to widowers, can rely on the perfect proxy of societal discrimination
against women, notwithstanding that many female beneficiaries of the
exemption may not have suffered identifiable harms from discrimina-
tion. As women, they are still surrounded by the ambient level of dis-
crimination against them; just like the military women in Ballard, they
may be excluded from jobs they neither need nor want, they may suc-
ceed despite the exclusion, but they will have been excluded neverthe-
less. The interesting question posed by these cases and by Justice
Ginsburg's reaffirmation in VM[ that sex-respecting rules will be up-
held if they are "used to compensate women 'for particular economic
disabilities they have suffered,' ... 'promote equal employment op-
portunity,' [or] advance full development of the talent and capacities
of our Nation's people,"67 is what limits, if any, there are on the use of
discrimination as a proxy to justify compensatory or affirmative action
schemes for women.r 8 Must there be some sort of narrow tailoring, or
will any scheme do so long as there is across the board discrimination
to serve as a perfect proxy?
III
DocRINAL INFLUENCES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW
OF SEX DISCRIMINAnON
The current constitutional law of sex discrimination is an excel-
lent example of what David Strauss has called "common law constitu-
tional interpretation."69 Not only is the notion that discrimination on
the basis of sex presumptively violates the Equal Protection Clause a
"settled principle [ ] "70 of law with no clear source in the text or origi-
that she "asked no favors for her sex." See Mary Anne Case, Of Richard Epstein and Other
Radical Feminists, 18 HARv. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 369, 407 (1995).
67 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
68 One limit, of course, is that imposed by the Court in Missippi University for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), to wit that the compensatory or affirmative action scheme
actually have the announced intent and effect. See id. In Hogan, the Court relied on the
longstanding numerical prominence of women in nursing and evidence that to keep nurs-
ing a predominantly female profession would depress nurses' wages, to reject the notion
that a dejure all-female nursing school could bejustified by a compensatory purpose. See
id. at 729-30. Moreover, for some sex-based affirmative action cases, a stereotype that is
archaic alone, even if not overbroad, might suffice to doom a rule. Ginsburg's answers to
questions about Kahn suggested that what was constitutionally objectionable about the tax
break at issue was that it lumped widows with the blind and infirm. Similarly, Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Hogan rejects an affirmative actionjustification for limiting training
in a traditionally female field to women. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730.
69 Strauss, supra note 7, at 879. I give the attention I do in this discussion to Strauss's
description of the common law method in constitutional law in part as the preemptive
response to what might be characterized as epistemological questions about my methods of
analysis.
70 Id. at 877.
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nal understanding of the Constitution, not only does it "rely... on
the elaborate body of law that has developed, mostly through judicial
decisions, over" the past quarter century,7 ' it is also a fine illustration
of the "fact [that] rules, as well as case-by-case decision making, are an
important part of the common law."72 While Justice Ginsburg's ma-
jority opinion exemplifies the application of common-law-style rules,
Justice Rehnquist's concurrence, like so much of Justice Rehnquist's
jurisprudence, is common law constitutional interpretation of a far
more primitive sort, "encompassing case-by-case method that empha-
sizes analogy, context, and 'situation sense.' 73
Justice Rehnquist concurrence in VMfis a splendid argument for
what, with a shudder at being unable to find a more graceful term, I
am tempted to call pro-active constitutionalism. This is the notion
that constitutional actors such as the state of Virginia and VMI are
under an obligation to take seriously the commands of the Constitu-
tion as interpreted by the precedents of the Court and apply them
even in the absence of litigation prodding them to do so. In faulting
Virginia for not seeing the handwriting on the wall, and following its
command even in advance of litigation, Justice Rehnquist seemed to
begin with a premise more associated with the civil law than the com-
mon law tradition, to wit that only a consistent line of cases (what the
Germans call "staendige Rechtsprechung" and the French 'jurispru-
dence constante)," rather than a single case, has any strong preceden-
tial force. He recounts the history of modern sex discrimination law,
beginning with Reed v. Reed.74 That case, he said, involved a fact pat-
tern quite different from VMI and hence did not put the school "on
notice that its holding would be extended across the constitutional
board. They were entitled to believe that 'one swallow doesn't make a
summer' and await further developments." 75 Interestingly, however, it
is not the long line of cases after Reed that, forJustice Rehnquist, con-
stitute the relevant developments. For him, "[tihose developments
were 11 years in coming.... Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan
71 Id,
72 Id. at 909.
73 Id As discussed elsewhere in this paper, Justice Rehnquist was slow to conclude
that sex-respecting rules are constitutionally problematic. He dissented in virtually every
case striking down a sex-respecting rule. The rare exceptions include Kirchberg v. Feenstra,
450 U.S. 455 (1981), in which hejoinsJustice Stewart's two paragraph concurrence to the
effect that "[s]ince men and women were similarly situated for all relevant purposes with
respect to the management and disposition of community property, [the statute at issue],
which allowed husbands but not wives to execute mortgages onjointly owned real property
without spousal consent, violated the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 463. But, like the
good common law lawyer he is, Justice Rehnquist deployed the very principle from whose
use against sex-respecting rules he dissented to write for the majority upholding such a
rule in Michael M.
74 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
75 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 561 (1996) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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... actually involv[ed] a single-sex admissions policy in higher educa-
tion .... This holding did place Virginia on notice that VMI's men-
only admissions policy was open to serious question."76 This is com-
mon law reasoning with a vengeance-only a precedent on all fours as
to the facts, not a developed rule of decision, is seen as binding.
Several different lines of precedent led to modem constitutional
sex discrimination law.
A. Title VII
Among the most important is Title VII, with its strong textual
commitment to anti-discrimination, and the subsequent interpreta-
tion of the BFOQ requirement to mandate a perfect proxy, that is to
say, to be limited in applicability to circumstances where no person of
the opposite sex could perform the job.77
Anti-stereotyping doctrine developed in a series of lower court
cases, 78 some of which combined constitutional and statutory ques-
tions, and hence impelled courts to apply the same standards to both.
Notable among these latter are (1) cases covering government em-
ployment, particularly those encompassing periods of time both
before and after such employment was subject to Title VII, and (2)
cases involving state laws limiting women's employment, which em-
body or are based on stereotypes, 79 such as the California law prohibit-
ing the employment of women bartenders at issue in Sail'er Inn v.
Kirby,80 a case cited with approval by the Supreme Court. To the ex-
tent the statute at issue in Kirby was applied to employers large enough
76 Id.
77 By 1968, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) set forth a nar-
row, anti-stereotyping construction of the BFOQ requirement. According to the EEOC:
[T]he following situations do not warrant the application of the bona fide
occupational qualification exception... (ii) The refusal to hire an individ-
ual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes. Such stereotypes
include, for example, that men are less capable of assembling intricate
equipment: that women are less capable of aggressive salesmanship. The
principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be considered on
the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics
generally attributed to the group.
29 C.F.R § 1604.2 (1998) (EEOC guidelines on discrimination because of sex).
78 Not all early lower court cases vindicating claims of unconstitutional sex discrimina-
tion used anti-stereotyping reasoning, or indeed any reasoning at all. See, e.g., Owen v.
Illinois Baking, 260 F. Supp. 820, 821 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (holding that "to grant a husband
the right to sue [for loss of consortium] while denying the wife access to the courts in the
assertion of the same right is too clearly a violation of Fourteenth Amendment equal pro-
tection guarantees to require citation of authority").
79 The bulk of such laws concerned sex respecting conditions of employment, such as
limitations on women's lifting more than a certain specified (low) weight on the job or on
women's working overtime or nights. After an initial period of indecision, the EEOC con-
demned such laws as incompatible with Title VII.
80 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971).
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to be covered by Title VII, the California Supreme Court struck it
down as conflicting with federal law, because it rested on impermissi-
ble stereotypes rather than anything amounting to a BFOQ. As to
employers not covered by Tide VII, the California court reached the
same result under the state and federal constitutions by applying strict
scrutiny, which it held applicable, "first, because the statute limits the
fundamental rights of one class of persons to pursue a lawful profes-
sion, and, second, because classifications based upon sex should be
treated as suspect."8' The earliest Supreme Court reference to sex
stereotyping appears during 1970 injustice Marshall's concurrence in
Phillips v. Martin Marietta,82 a Tide VII case. The term enters the
Court's constitutional vocabulary in Frontiero three years later.
Approaching the early constitutional sex discrimination cases
with Tide VII standards in mind may have been encouraged by the
fact that a disproportionate number of such cases before the Court,
among them Frontiero, involved employment related issues such as the
terms and conditions of government employment and pension bene-
fits. Even Reed's petition to be appointed estate administrator is in
essence an application for a job. Moreover, Hogan, VMT, and Stanton
involve education explicitly seen as vocational; and many of the most
notorious cases of the pre-Reed era, for example, Bradwel4 Muller, and
Goesshart, restricted women's job opportunities. In examining the ex-
tent to which constitutional sex discrimination law is path dependent
on Title VII, it is important to note where the paths diverge. Of
course, the most dramatic divergence is in the failure of the Court to
adopt a constitutional disparate impact standard as expansive as that
imposed under Title VII. But it is also worth considering if the ques-
tion of whether pregnancy-based rules are sex-respecting, and hence
problematic, might have been answered differently had a statutory
case, in which women could have relied more strongly on EEOC
Guidelines, had reached the Court before the purely constitutional
case of Geduldig.
B. The ERA
At the other extreme of the path dependency question, it is also
worth asking how, if at all, the constitutional law of sex discrimination
might have evolved differently if the text of reference had not been
Tide VII, which explicitly prohibits "discriminat[ion] .. .because of
... sex,"83 but instead the ERA, which, in its 1970s textual incarnation
provided instead that "[e] quality of rights under the law shall not be
81 Id. at 539.
82 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
83 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2).
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denied or abridged . . . on account of sex."8 4 Some evidence of a
different path can be seen in interpretations of state ERAs. Thus, for
example, the Washington Supreme Court, interpreting that state's
ERA, upheld a requirement that "the two members of the State Demo-
cratic Committee elected by the county central committees be of the
opposite sex"85 and the chair and vice-chair also be of the opposite sex
on the grounds that these rules "assure[d] women actual as well as
theoretical equality of rights."86
On the whole, however, there are numerous persuasive reasons
to suspect that a change in textual basis from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to an Equal Rights Amendment would have made little differ-
ence. Among them are, first, that the relevant portion of the
Fourteenth Amendment, like the ERA, makes a textual commitment
to equality rather than against discrimination.87 Second, all sides in
the ERA debate, but particularly the most vocal and authoritative pro-
ponents of the Amendment, were in agreement that its effect would
be to prohibit sex distinctions in the law-whatever else it might have
done, the Amendment would not, according to participants in ERA
debates, have changed the result in those cases in which the Court
struck down sex-respecting rules. Indeed, as noted above, the current
constitutional doctrine on sex discrimination bears a striking resem-
[T]he statute forbids an employer to 'fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,' or to 'limit, segregate,
or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's... sex.' ... We take these words to mean that gender [i.e.,
sex] must be irrelevant to employment decisions.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-40 (1989) (citations omitted) (case super-
seded by statute but not for the proposition cited).
84 S.J. Res., 92d Cong. (1971). This is a different question than the one, pressed by
Mary Becker, of how, if at all, the law might be different if feminists in the early 1970s had
concentrated their quest for equality on the legislatures instead of the courts. See Mary
Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and
Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 209, 211 (1998).
85 Machiaro v. Chaney, 582 P.2d 487, 489 (1978).
86 Id. at 491 (internal quotations omitted). The court insisted:
Neither sex may predominate. Neither may discriminate or be discrimi-
nated against. There is an equality of numbers and an equality of rights to
be in office and to control the affairs of the state committee. The ironic
result of the plaintiffs' theory would be to abolish a statute which mandates
equality by invoking a provision of the constitution passed to guarantee
equality.
Id. at 492. It was left to the dissent to articulate principles more closely associated with the
anti-stereotyping lines on which the federal constitutional law developed, to the effect that
"the majority opinion prevents the Equal Rights Amendment from achieving its purpose of
making sex a neutral factor, one to be disregarded in favor of ability and performance." Id.
at 497 (Horowitz, J., dissenting).
87 The phrasing is, of course, not identical, but it is difficult to read into the change in
wording a move away from an anti-discrimination toward an equality norm.
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blance to that set forth by the authors of an influential Yale Law Jour-
nal article endorsing and interpreting the ERA.88
C. The Court's Contemporaneous Campaign Against
Irrebuttable Presumptions and in Favor of Individualized
Adjudication
Most interestingly, the Court's rejection of overbroad sex stereo-
types is part of the jurisprudential climate of the time, during which,
across a wide spectrum of subject areas and predicate constitutional
provisions, the Court insisted on individualized adjudication rather
than reliance on overbroad presumptions. A sea of concern about the
constitutional difficulties with overbroad rules and imperfect proxies
swept over the Court in precisely that time period during which the
current constitutional law of sex discrimination was developing. At
the time of its development, sex discrimination doctrine was one of
many related, flourishing life forms in this sea, but, by the time the sea
receded toward the end of the 1970s, only sex discrimination doctrine
had developed the hard skeleton necessary to insure both a clear fossil
record and the continuing viability of the organism.8 9
The most closely related and well known of the group of doc-
trines I have in mind is the notion that irrebuttable presumptions are
constitutionally problematic. In addition to being the background as-
sumption in sex discrimination cases like Reed,90 this doctrine also was
decisive in cases involving issues related to sex, but not analyzed by the
Court as involving sex-respecting rules. Chief among the latter group
of cases is Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,91 involving a require-
ment that pregnant teachers stop work at a fixed point fairly early in
their pregnancy. Although a lower court saw such a rule as sex dis-
88 See Brown et al., supra note 14.
89 Cf. RUDOLF A. RAFF, THE SHAPE OF LIFE: GENES, DEvEsOpMENT, AND THE EVOLUTION
OF ANiMAL FoRM 63-102 (1996) (surveying paleontological data to understand the develop-
ment of animals found on Earth).
90 As a technical matter, the Court in Reed did not discuss the overbroad generaliza-
tions on which the preference for males might have been based, such as what the lower
court identified as their greater likelihood of having business experience. Instead the
Court treated the preference for males as arbitrary. The rule struck down in Reed is like a
coin flip in which the coin comes up heads disproportionately. Cf TOM STOPPARD, ROSEN-
cRANTz AND GUiLDENSTERN ARE DEAD act. 1, Sc. 1 (Henry Popkin ed., 1967). A fair coin flip
is bad enough-arbitrary, but random. Sex-respecting rules work like flipping a weighted
coin-men are disproportionately likely to win and women to lose. This is why courts will
not allow stereotypical generalizations, even highly accurate ones (i.e., good predictors) to
justify race or sex-respecting rules-because those on the losing side of the generalization
or the coin flip almost always lose. Compare alphabetical order by last name as a basis for
the state to distribute things that really matter. This system would be troubling whether
the first in line gets punished or rewarded.
91 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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criminatory, the Supreme Court struck it down as instead involving an
impermissible irrebuttable presumption of incapacity to work.
Other cases at the intersection of sex discrimination and irrebut-
table presumptions involve rules governing the rights of illegitimate
children and their parents, 92 such as Stanley v. Illinois,93 the second
case after Reed in which the Court struck down a sex-respecting rule.94
The rule in Stanley, struck as a violation of due process as well as equal
protection, would have deprived a father of the custody of his illegiti-
mate, motherless children without a hearing. In arguing unsuccess-
fully against an individualized hearing for Stanley's claim, Illinois
relied on stereotypes, on overbroad generalizations, on irrebuttable
presumptions-three terms of art for the same practice-about fa-
thers in general and non-marital fathers in particular.95 Illinois "ar-
gued that unmarried fathers are so seldom fit that [it] ... need not
undergo the administrative inconvenience of inquiry in any case."9 6
Citing, inter alia, Reed,97 the Court held that, though Illinois's wish for
"prompt efficacious procedures" was a "proper state interest," it was
insufficient: "[T] he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed
and efficiency."98
But numerous cases in this line had nothing whatever to do with
sex. In the years surrounding the development of current sex discrim-
ination law, the Court also held it would be unconstitutional to pre-
sume conclusively that soldiers were not bona fide residents of the
town in which they were stationed;99 that only property holders and
parents were interested in school board elections;10 0 that Communist
92 This line of cases begins with two wrongful death suits involving illegitimate chil-
dren and their mothers: Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), and Glona v. American Guar-
antee; 391 U.S. 73 (1968). Justice Douglas for the majority insisted that illegitimate
children are no less close to their mother, nor she less solicitous of them, than legitimate
children. See Glona, 391 U.S. at 75. Justice Harlan in his dissent insisted that the fact of
such closeness is irrelevant to the statuory scheme which, both before and after the Court's
expansive intervention, "generally defined classes of proper plaintiffs by highly arbitrary
lines based on family relationships, excluding issues concerning the actual effect of the
death on the plaintiff." Id at 77 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
93 405 U.S. 645 (1971).
94 There is a direct line from Stanley to the most recent Supreme Court case examin-
ing the constitutionality of a sex-respecting rule, also a rule premised on a father's lack of
connection to his illegitimate children, Miller v. Alhrigh4 523 U.S. 420 (1998), discussed
below.
95 See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 653 n.5 (noting how Illinois's Brief cited "physiological and
other studies . . . [for] the proposition that men are not naturally inclined to
childrearing").
96 Id. at 656.
97 The Court also cited irrebuttable presumption cases like Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89 (1965). See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 655-56.
98 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656.
99 See Carrington, 380 U.S. at 96.
lo See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1969).
14672000]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
party members would engage in subversive acts if given passports' 01 or
public employment; 10 2 and that recent migrants from one state to an-
other were not entitled to voting rights, 10 3 welfare 10 4 or in-state tuition
benefits.'0 5 As with sex-respecting rules so with the presumptions in
these cases-a single exception was enough to doom the rule. Only
presumptions universally true withstood scrutiny and individual ex-
ceptions to the rule were entitled to individual adjudication.
In addition to the line of cases explicitly objecting to irrebuttable
presumptions, the Court during the decade in which constitutional
sex discrimination doctrine developed emphasized individualized ad-
judication and opposed overbroad rules in a variety of other contexts.
For example, the early 1970s were the high water mark of First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine. 10 6 By the mid-1970s, the Court in-
sisted that mandatory death sentences for certain offenses were over-
broad and consideration of individual circumstances was
constitutionally required. 10 7 And an emphasis on the benefits and
corresponding lack of concern for the costs of individualized adjudi-
cation extended at the time beyond the area of irrebuttable presump-
tions into other due process cases.' 08
Finally, in his opinion in Weinberger v. Sa/fi,109 which is generally
considered to mark the end of the era of heightened scrutiny for most
irrebuttable presumptions, Justice Rehnquist, at the time still not con-
vinced that special attention to laws discriminating on the basis of sex
was a good idea, indicated that he understood quite well the relation-
ship between irrebuttable presumptions and the evolving law of sex
discrimination when he cited with approval, as examples of permissi-
ble presumptions, the restrictions on women at issue not only in
Geduldig, but also in Goesaert v. Cleary.10
It is in no small part because Justice Rehnquist's view of the con-
tinuing validity of precedents such as Goesart, was distinctly a minority
101 SeeAptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 511-17 (1964).
102 See Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 16-19 (1966).
1o See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 359-60 (1972).
104 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638-42 (1969), overruled in part by, Edelman
v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
105 See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453-54 (1973).
106 See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1972).
107 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976).
108 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-70 (1970).
109 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (upholding prohibition on widow's receipt of Social Security
survivor's benefits when her relationship with the wage earner had not existed at least nine
months prior to his death). Justice Rehnquist had long been of the view, hitherto ex-
pressed in dissent, that what his brethren considered impermissible, irrebuttable presump-
tions were what, in the days since the rejection of the Chancellor's foot as a measure, was
prized as law-general rules announced in advance and uniformly applied.
110 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding prohibition on women working in bar not owned
by her husband or father).
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opinion on the Court by the mid-1970s that heightened scrutiny for
sex-respecting rules survived the demise of the irrebuttable presump-
tion doctrine. By that time the Court had adopted Ruth Bader Gins-
burg's view that all pre-Reed cases involving sex distinctions were
"Precedent in Need of Re-evaluation.""' The Court's re-evaluation of
this precedent was itself a major influence on the development of the
current law.
D. Justice Bradley as the Bogeyman
The embodiment of all that modem constitutional sex discrimi-
nation law sets its face against is the concurring opinion of Justice
Bradley in Bradwell v. Illinois,1 12 an opinion repeatedly cited with
strong disapproval by the modem Court and commentators. The ma-
jority in Bradwell held that, a license to practice law not being a privi-
lege or immunity of citizenship, the state of Illinois had not violated
the Privileges or Immunities clause by denying Myra Bradwell's peti-
tion for admission to the bar solely on grounds of her sex. 113 Justice
Bradley, as one of the dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases, had a
more expansive view of privileges and immunities; indeed, as further
discussed below, his dissent opined that "a law which prohibits a large
class of citizens from adopting a lawful employment ... [deprives]
them of liberty as well as property, without due process of law." 1 4 In
Bradwell he exhibits no such qualms about depriving the large class of
female citizens of such an opportunity, even in the absence of express
legislation.115 Passages from his concurrence have been quoted in so
many opinions and commentaries in the last quarter century that
scholars of sex discrimination can practically recite them by heart.116
It was these passages that Justice Brennan quoted just before he said
in Frontiero that, "as a result of notions such as this, our statute books
became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes
and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th century the position of
women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of
111 Amicus Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union at 34, Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973), cited in Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 955, 979 n.88 (1984).
112 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). Bradwelljoins Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), and Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in a small group
of cases the modem Court uses as the antithesis of a precedent: It is, for the modem
Court, an argument against holding a certain way that to do so would be in conformity with
the reasoning of the majority in one of these anti-precedents.
113 See Bradwe, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 139.
114 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 122 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting).
115 See Bradwl, 83 U.S. (16 Wal.) at 139-42 (Bradley, J., concurring).
116 The passages are found in Bradwel, id. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring).
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blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes."11 7 Justice Bradley's opin-
ion is chockablock with stereotypes. He regularly paired normative
and descriptive stereotypes, talking of what is "natural and proper" or
what "belongs to the female sex."118
Although Justice Bradley recognized that there are exceptions to
all his male and female stereotypes, for example, there are unmarried
women not subject to coverture, he left no space for them. A similar
recognition that there are individual exceptions, coupled with a reso-
lute refusal to make space for them in the law, infected other earlier
Supreme Court sex discrimination cases that the modem Court views
as negative precedent. Thus, for example, Justice Brewer in Muller v.
Oregon"9g justified the paternalistic protection of women in employ-
ment contracts by enumerating the various physical, educational, and
temperamental disadvantages that a woman faced when asserting her
rights. 120 He then admitted that "[d]oubfless there are individual ex-
ceptions," but took no account of the effect of the rule the Court up-
117 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
118 Bradwel4 83 U.S. at 141. At least one of the stereotypes Justice Bradley relied on is
expressly prohibited by the EEOC guidelines cited above. See supra note 77 and accompa-
nying text. Thus, while the EEOC deems it impermissible stereotyping to assume that "wo-
men are less capable of aggressive salesmanship," 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (a) (1) (ii) (1990),
Justice Bradley used the alleged need for lawyers to exhibit "that decision and firmness
which are presumed to predominate in the sterner sex," Bradweli; 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 142
(Bradley, J., concurring), in essence to establish a BFOQ for males as lawyers. Note that
nothing in the EEOC's formulation addresses stereotyping of the job, rather than the ap-
plicant. Thus, while it constitutes sex discrimination to assume that "women are less capa-
ble of aggressive salesmanship," the EEOC does no better than Justice Bradley with the
stereotype that success on the job requires qualities such as aggressiveness, "presumed to
predominate in the sterner sex." The regulations merely give individual women the oppor-
tunity to prove that they can be as aggressive (as masculine?) as is assumed to be required.
Judging by the oral argument of the VMT case, we seem, unfortunately, not to have ad-
vanced far beyond Justice Bradley in our assumptions that good lawyering requires quali-
ties gendered masculine. Arguing for the United States, Paul Bender analogized VMI to a
traditional Socratic method law school with large classes and issue spotting exams, and
VWIL to an all female law school with a nurturing teaching style and seminar papers, on
the assumption, apparently shared by a majority of the Court, that only the former would
adequately prepare students. See Oral Argument at 22-24, United States v. Vnginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996) (No. 94-1941). For further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, Two Cheers for
Cheerleading. The Noisy Integration of VMT and the Quiet Success of Virginia Women in Leadership,
1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 347. By contrast to both Justice Bradley and Bender, Matthew Hale
Carpenter, Bradwel's lawyer, while he accepted the stereotype of women as gentler than
men, argued to the court that traits gendered as feminine can have advantages over those
gendered as masculine in the practice of law. According to Carpenter, "[t]here may be
cases in which a client's rights can only be rescued by an exercise of the rough qualities
possessed by men. There are many causes in which the silver voice of woman would ac-
complish more than the severity and sternness of man could achieve." Bradwell 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) at 137.
119 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
120 See id. at 421-22.
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held on such exceptions. 2 1 The modem constitutional and statutory
law of sex discrimination makes a place for these exceptional women.
For, in rejectingJustice Bradley's opinion as precedent, the Court has
concluded that "rules of civil society" not only can but "must be
adapted to ... exceptional cases."'
122
E. Analogies from Race Cases
In insisting on a place for exceptional individuals, modem sex
discrimination doctrine not only rejects earlier cases involving sex dis-
crimination, but, furthering the parallelsJustice Brennan observed be-
tween race and sex discrimination, draws implicit support from race
cases interpreting the requirements of equality in a time of separate
spheres for race as well as sex, the time of "separate but equal."
123
Given that what all these lines of precedent leading up to the constitu-
tional law of sex discrimination have in common is a focus on the
individual, it should hardly have surprised Justice Scalia that the exis-
121 Id. at 422. The Brandeis brief, relied on by the court in Muller, quotes a certain
"Mr. B._, a foreman of a large printing establishment" to the effect that he "never knew
but one woman, and she a strong, vigorous Irishwoman, of unusual height, who could
stand at the case like a man." Brief for Defendant in Error at 38, Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107).
122 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 142 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
123 These cases include, for example, McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.,
235 U.S. 151 (1914), which rejected the argument that limited demand by blacks justified
providing sleeping cars only for whites, on the grounds that it made the right
depend upon the number of persons who may be discriminated against,
whereas the essence of the constitutional right is that it is a personal
one.... It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the
laws, and if he is denied... a facility or convenience... which under
substantially the same circumstances is furnished to another. . ., he may
properly complain that his constitutional privilege has been invaded.
Id. at 161-62; see also Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 350 (1938) ("We find
it impossible to conclude that what otherwise would be an unconstitutional discrimination
... can bejustified by requiring resort to opportunities elsewhere."). The implication of
these opinions was clear to the lower courtjudge deciding a companion case to VMT, Shan-
non Faulkner's petition to be admitted to the Citadel. Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552
(D.S.C. 1994), aff'd, United States v. Jones, 136 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 1998). Responding to
the argument that too few women were interested in a Citadel-style education to make it
worth the state's while to provide them with one, Judge Houck said, "[t]o suggest that a
lack of demand for a certain type of equal protection can somehow justify the denial of
another person's constitutional right thereto undermines the express intent of the Four-
teenth Amendment." 858 F. Supp. at 564. Justice Ginsburg had the same principle in
mind when, in her Miller dissent, she quoted Bumita Sheldon Matthews, the first female
federal district judge, to the effect that "[w]hether there are a lot of people who suffer or
whether there are a few who suffer, it seems to us that the principle of equal application of
the law to men and women ought to receive recognition." Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420,
471 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting testimony of Burnita Shelton Matthews,
Heaings on H.R. 3673 and H.R 77 Before the House Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization,
73d Cong. 36 (1933)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tence of even one woman interested in and capable of attending VMI
would require an end to its all-male status. 124
Having set forth what I believe to be the central features of the
current constitutional law of sex discrimination, its parameters and its
origins, I should now like to consider the implications of that law for
several open issues likely to be presented to courts in the near future.
IV
FROM SEX DISCRIMINATION TO SEX EQUALITY
As Ruth Colker has observed, "[tiwo sometimes conflicting prin-
ciples, anti-differentiation and anti-subordination, underlie equal pro-
tection jurisprudence." 125 At present, our constitutional standard
with respect to sex is not, as Colker would have it, "anti-subordination
above all," but rather "anti-stereotyping" above all. Notwithstanding
the heroic efforts of Colker and others to argue to the contrary, I re-
main of the view that with respect to the sexes, anti-differentiation is
also normatively (i.e., in terms not only of what the law now does, but
what it should do), an attractive principle, unfashionable though that
view may now be.126
There are two main ways of formulating the principle behind the
constitutional norm against the denial of equal protection on grounds
124 Moreover, Justice Scalia's own focus on the individual in race cases is in substantial
tension with his and other conservatives' willingness to focus on the group in sex cases.
Thus, for example, other than the substitution of sex for race, the position on the relation-
ship between remedy and standing Justice Scalia articulates in his J.E.B. dissent, J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 156-63 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting), is identical to that ofJustice
Stevens set forth in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 676-79 (1993); a tension Justice Scalia
nowhere bothers to resolve or even acknowledge. This inconsistency is common among
conservatives: Ted Olson, admittedly a hired gun, but one who frequently chooses his cli-
ents for the ideological appeal of their position, represented both Virginia in the Supreme
Court argument of the VMT case and Cheryl Hopwood in her litigation successfully chal-
lenging the University of Texas's affirmative action policies. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d
932 (5th Cir. 1996). This put him squarely on both sides of the anti-stereotyping question.
For women, Olson argued to the Supreme Court in VMl, individual merit was or should
legally be irrelevant-group averages or tendencies could and should shape the law and
exceptions be damned. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 517-18 (1996). But, in
Hopwood, he successfully insisted on behalf of plaintiffs that all applicants to the University
of Texas Law School be evaluated as individuals and not lumped with their racial group.
See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
125 Ruth Colker, Anti-subordination Above Ala Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1003, 1003 (1986). Especially to the great extent to which these principles do not
conflict, both are important in constitutional sex-equalityjurisprudence. See, e.g., Sylvia A.
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1017 (1984) (proposing
scrutiny of laws to ensure that the law "has no significant impact in perpetuating the op-
pression of women or culturally imposed sex role constraints on individual freedom").
126 Obviously, I do not endorse the subordination of women, but unlike some feminist
theorists, see, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense to Talk About "Women", 1
U.C.L. WoMEN's Lj. 15, 33 n.84 (1991), I see the goal of feminism as seeking for men, as
well as women, liberty as well as equality. See generally Case, supra note --, at 4.
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of sex. The first is that women should not be subordinated by the law
or, more broadly, by men. The second is that sex should be irrelevant
to an individual's treatment by the law, and, more broadly, to his or
her life chances. On the latter view, "fixed notions concerning the
roles and abilities of males and females" 127 are problematic when em-
bodied in law, even in law that does not in any articulable way
subordinate women to men. Note, despite superficial similarity lead-
ing to a temptation to conflate them, it is not the case that the latter
principle necessarily reduces to formal equality and the former to sub-
stantive equality, as those are conventionally defined. Even if one con-
fines one's inquiry exclusively to laws that discriminate on their face
on the basis of sex (i.e., to sex-respecting rules, of the sort at issue in
the vast majority of modern Supreme Court cases on the sexes and
equal protection), one might still care whether the purpose or effect
of a particular sex-respecting rule was to subordinate women and be
inclined to strike down only those that can be demonstrated to do so.
For example, this led then-Justice Rehnquist to object to striking down
Oklahoma's higher beer-purchasing age for men.128 By analogy to
race cases, 129 it may lead to an easier defense of affirmative action
measures for women. It leads Andrew Koppelman, among others who
claim that prohibiting same sex marriage impermissibly discriminates
on the basis of sex, to demonstrate at some length that restricting en-
try into marriage to two persons of different sexes has the intent and
effect of subordinating women.'8 0 On the other hand, those who
think sex should be irrelevant need not confine themselves to urging
127 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
128 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 219-220 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In
Craig, Justice Rehnquist observed:
There is no suggestion in the Court's opinion that males in this age group
are in any way peculiarly disadvantaged, subject to systematic discriminatory
treatment, or otherwise in need of special solicitude from the courts....
[T] here being no plausible argument that this is a discrimination against
females, the Court's reliance on our previous sex discrimination cases is ill-
founded. It treats gender-classification as a talisman which-without re-
gard to the rights involved or the persons affected-calls into effect a heav-
ier burden of judicial review.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
129 For the difference between a welcome mat and a no trespassing sign, see Adarand
Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130 See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Dis-
crimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197, 255-57 (1994). Cf Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the
Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. Rxv. 187, 188, 232 (arguing that legal condemnation
of homosexuality "can best be understood as preserving traditional concepts of masculinity
and femininity" and as a result injures "everyone who seeks freedom to experience the full
range of human emotions, behavior and relationships without gender-defined con-
straints"). I take Law to be saying far more explicitly than Koppelman that "fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females" are problematic, quite apart from
their subordinating effects. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725
(1982).
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the abolition of sex-respecting rules. Thus, for example, Wendy Wil-
liams, who was accused of seeking only "formal equality" in her call for
"equal treatment," insisted that her "larger strategy" was to "get the
law out of the business of reinforcing traditional, sex-based family
roles and to alter the workplace so as to keep it in step with the in-
creased participation of women."1'3 Not just any sex-neutral rule
would accomplish this end, according to Williams; instead "[a]n an-
drogynous prototype requires sex neutral schemes that take into ac-
count the normal range of human characteristics-including
pregnancy."'13 2
It is no accident that we now refer to the law of sex discrimination
rather than say, of sex equality. The Court has notoriously failed to
consider anything that is not a sex-respecting rule to violate the consti-
tutional norm against the denial of equal protection on grounds of
sex. What it has required is not that the protection be equal, but that
the rule be the same. 33 Not only has it failed ever to find disparate
impact by sex to rise to the level of unconstitutional discrimination, it
has occasionally been blind even to the disparity of the impact 34 and
for long did not even see sex discrimination implicated in abortion
questions. 3 5
'3' Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treat-
ment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Ra,. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 352 (1985).
132 Id. at 369. See generally Case, supra note if, passim (calling for attention to be paid
to which sex neutral rules are chosen).
133 Thus, the Court has not come close to adopting anything like Robin West's "pure
protection" approach whose "goal is a community in which all are equally protected by the
state against private encroachment of rights." Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape,
and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendmen4 42 F.A. L. Rxv. 45, 62 (1990); see also Case, supra
note 66, at 401-05 (1995) (discussing West's "pure protection theory" and citing relevant
sources). One of the many reasons for the Court's failure in this regard may be the extent
to which it today ranks Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), together with cases like
Bradwell as negative precedents. In Muller, the Court upheld differential-hours laws for
certain working women on the grounds, inter alia, that, because "there is that in
[woman's] disposition and habits which will operate against a full assertion of those rights.
She will still be where some legislation to protect her seems necessary to secure a real
equality of right." Muller, 208 U.S. at 422.
134 See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
135 The true test of the Court's blindness to sex (not to be confused with sex-blind-
ness) might have come with a final resolution in United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380 (6th
Cir. 1996), vacated, 520 U.S. 259 (1997), the federal criminal case against a Tennessee state
judge who, inter alia, forcibly raped female employees and litigants "while wearing his
judicial robes" and implicity or explicitly threatened them with retaliation in the form of
dismissal or an adverse judgment if they resisted. Id. at 1400 (Keith, J., joining in the
dissent). The Sixth Circuit en banc reversed Lanier's conviction for violation of a federal
statute, criminalizing willful "'deprivation of any rights ... protected by the Constitution'
committed by any person 'under color of any law'" and ordered his release from the 25-
year prison term to which he had been sentenced. 73 F.3d at 1382-84 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 (1994)). According to a majority of the Sixth Circuit, Lanier's conviction could not
stand because no prior case had put Lanier on notice that sexual assault by ajudge would
constitute a violation of the broadly worded federal statute. See id. at 1384. As several
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It may be worth noting that the main proponent on the Court of
the anti-subordination strand in the current constitutional law of sex
discrimination is ChiefJustice Rehnquist. 136 Not only has he objected
in the past to giving heightened scrutiny to laws disfavoring men, his
VM! concurrence insisted:
[I] t is not the "exclusion of women" that violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, but the maintenance of an all-men school without pro-
viding any-much less a comparable-institution for women....
An adequate remedy in my opinion might be a demonstration by
Virginia that its interest in educating men in a single-sex environ-
ment is matched by its interest in educating women in a single-sex
institution. To demonstrate such, the Commonwealth does not
need to create two institutions with the same number of faculty
Ph.D.'s, similar SAT scores, or comparable athletic fields.... Nor
would it necessarily require that the women's insitution offer the
same curriculum as the men's; one could be strong in computer
science, the other could be strong in liberal arts. It would be a suffi-
cient remedy, I think, if the two institutions offered the same quality
of education and were of the same overall caliber.'3 7
This opinion sounds suspiciously like a vision of separate (but
equal) spheres, a vision of equality in sexual difference often an-
nounced, but never, to my mind, realized.'38 As with the separate but
equal racial spheres categorically rejected in Brown and its progeny,
much of the problem with constitutionally endorsed, state-enforced,
separate spheres for the sexes may be a practical one. As Justice Sou-
ter noted at oral argument in VAM, because we do not stand "on the
world's first morning" with respect to sex distinctions, but rather at
the close of millenia of subordination, continued separation of the
indignant dissenters pointed out, the Sixth Circuit's decision worked a grave injustice. See
id. at 1399 (Keith, J., joining in the dissent); id. at 1398 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The majority made much of the fact that the United States had
charged Lanier only with unconstitutional deprivation of his victims' liberty, not with "a
gender-based crime for sexual assault involving discrimination against or oppression of
women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 1384. The real equal protection
violation will occur, however, not when a judge rapes a woman, but when the law fails to
take this violation as seriously as it takes, for example, the nonsexual assaults perpetrated
on male prisoners by their guards. See id. at 1414 (DaughtreyJ., dissenting). Whether this
violation will occur is not yet clear, given that the Supreme Court, while unanimously re-
versing the Sixth Circuit, left many crucial issues open on remand and Lanier, by fleeing
the country, prevented consideration of those issues by the court below. See United States
v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
136 I do not mean this observation as a cheap shot against the anti-subordination posi-
tion, nor do I mean to suggest that otherJustices are unconcerned with issues of subordi-
nation. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 273-74 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
137 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 565 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
138 For further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, UnpackingPackage Deals: Separate Spheres
Are Not the Answer, 75 DENY. L. REv. 1305 (1998).
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sexes along the remedial lines suggested by Chief Justice Rehnquist
cannot be free of a subordinating taint.139
I would argue, however, that the objections go beyond impracti-
cability. The constitutional principle that "[t]here is no caste here"140
is not cashed out by "[t] here is no subordination here." The Constitu-
tion "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens," not even
separate but equal classes. 14' Imagine, for example, a society with two
castes, not upper and lower, not Brahmin and untouchable, but priest
and warrior. 142 The two castes are equal in status, but radically differ-
ent in role. Those born into the priest caste are limited to the role of
priest even if they would rather fight than pray, and vice versa. Is such
a division consistent with the American Constitution? I do not think
SO.' 4 3 As Justice Harlan's dissent in Pessy v. Ferguson makes clear, the
problems with equality of separate spheres exceed the practical: the
Constitution guarantees liberty as well as equality.14  Indeed, the con-
stitutional equality norm itself has regularly been interpreted to guar-
antee equal liberty.145 I would say of Justice Rehnquist's remedy for
VM[ what Justice Harlan said of the legislation at issue in Pessy: "In-
deed, such legislation, as that here in question, is inconsistent not
only with that equality of rights which pertains to citizenship, National
and State, but with the personal liberty enjoyed by every one within
the United States."146 My contention is that, under the Constitution,
no less than under Title VII, "[a] s for the legal relevance of sex stere-
otyping, we are beyond the day when [individuals of either sex can
be] evaluate[d] by assuming or insisting that they match[ ] the stereo-
139 Oral Argument at 18, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (No. 94-1941).
140 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by,
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Of course, Brown overruled the majority in
Pkssy, not Justice Harlan's dissent.
141 Pessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
142 This is not all that farfetched a hypothetical, at least in its assumption that there
can be equality in difference. Consider, for example, the estates of the clergy and nobility
in medieval and early modem France. The relationship between these groups, the First
and Second Estates, presents a somewhat different problem than the conventional one of
subordination framed by the position of the Third Estate. Both clergy and nobility ran the
gamut of wealth and power, from the impoverished country squire and village priest, to the
prelates and princes of the royal line. And the two estates were distributed throughout the
land. Although nominally the clergy was the premier estate, the nobility was hardly
subordinate. Role differentiation, rather than inequality, marked the difference between
the two.
143 Ironically, strong support for the proposition I am here advancing comes from
none other than Justice Bradley. See SIaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36, 111-13
(Bradley, J, dissenting) (arguing that choosing employment is one of a citizen's most valu-
able rights and using the example of a caste system to support his contention).
144 163 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
145 See id.
146 Id.
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type associated with their group."' 47 This is so whether or not that
stereotype is itself subordinating or demeaning.
V
OPEN QUESTIONS IN THE CONSTTrUTIONAL LAW OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION
I began this paper with the assertion that VMT marked the end,
not the beginning, of a line of constitutional cases. This is because,
within the narrow range the Court has identified as raising the consti-
tutional problem of denial of equal protection on grounds of sex, few
open questions remain. With all but a few exceptions, several of
which I will discuss below, sex-respecting rules have vanished from the
statute books and practices of state actors. Without exception, no
practice that does not involve a sex-respecting rule has yet been seen
by the Court as denying equal protection on grounds of sex and the
VMT opinion certainly does not signal a change in this regard.
Many commentators, most of them critics, see the progress of the
constitutional law of sex discrimination as, for better and for worse,
the triumph of "sameness" feminism. A "sameness feminist," by my
definition, is one who, if asked when, if ever, there should be sex-
respecting rules, that is to say, rules that distinguish on their face be-
tween males and females, would give an answer straight out of Gilbert
and Sullivan: When? "[n] ever... What, never? No, never! ... Hardly
ever!",1
4 8
In part because of the limited success constitutional sex discrimi-
nation law has had in promoting sex equality, "sameness" feminism is
out of favor. Nevertheless, I, for one, still find it appealing. I by no
means believe that all the problems posed by feminist jurisprudence
can be solved by abolishing sex-respecting rules. But I think very few
can be solved by instituting or affirming such rules. And, although
many sensible criticisms have been made of the oppressive downside
of abolishing such rules,' 49 I think the radical possibilities of abolition
have not been fully explored.
This Article is part of a larger project examining the tag ends of
"sameness" feminist jurisprudence, including an inquiry, from both a
147 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
148 W.S. GILBERT, H.M.S. Pinafore, in THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF GILBERT AN SULLIVAN
106 (Random House 1936) (1878).
149 I take much, but not all, of the quarrel that other feminist theorists have with the
opponents of sex-respecting rules to turn on a theory of the second best. If the single,
uniform, non-sex respecting form of most rules could reliably be formulated favorably to
women's interests or neutrally between men's and women's interests, there might be much
less objection to its implementation. But, in a world of law and social practice built largely
around male, masculine standards, merely striking down the sex-respecting character of
the rule masks, rather than eliminates, the rule's pernicious effects.
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legal and a theoretical perspective, into the few sex-respecting rules
we have left. °50 A complete consideration of the appropriate treat-
ment of each of these rules under the current structure of the consti-
tutional law of sex discrimination, while certainly more manageable
than any broader consideration of the appropriate scope of claims for
sex equality under the Constitution, is still beyond the scope of this
Article. Rather, I will limit myself to considering briefly three broad
categories of remaining sex-respecting rules, those involving males
and females as mothers and fathers, as participants in marriage, and
as students in public schools.
A. Miller v. Aibright and the Future of the Stereotyping of
Mothers and Fathers
One piece of evidence that VMF changes nothing is furnished by
the only constitutional sex discrimination case subsequently decided
by the Supreme Court, Miller v. Albright151 That case involved a com-
plex network of sex-respecting rules on citizenship whose net effect in
the case before the Court was to deny citizenship to Lorelyn Miller.
Miller was born in the Phillippines to a U.S. citizen and a Phillippine
woman not his wife, but only acknowledged by her American father
after she had grown to adulthood.152 The laws at issue, because they
granted citizenship to the nonmarital children of citizen fathers and
alien mothers on different and less generous terms than they did to
the nonmarital children of citizen mothers and alien fathers, facially
discriminated on the basis of sex.153 In a welter of opinions, 54 seven
150 The project began with Disaggregating Gender. See Case, supra note -t. The next
article in the series will be on toilets as gendered spaces. This future Article will examine
one of the few sex-segregated spaces left in our culture and is intended to confront
squarely the use of the prospect of mandatory single-sex public toilets as an argument-
stopping reductio for the "sameness" approach. The first part of this future Article will use
the all too concrete example of bathrooms to ask what and how we are equalizing in a
world of separate but equal; the second will examine what we would lose if toilets ceased to
be segregated spaces. After the "toilet paper," I plan papers on sports and prisons.
151 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
152 See id. at 424-26.
153 See id. at 426.
154 Justice Stevens, speaking for himself and ChiefJustice Rehnquist, opined that the
plaintiff had standing, see id. at 433, but lost on the merits because, although "we may
assume that if the classification... were merely the product of an outmoded stereotype, it
would be invalid, [t]he biological differences between single men and single women pro-
vide a relevant basis for differing rules." Id. at 443-45. Justice O'Connor, for herself and
Justice Kennedy, opined that the plaintiff lacked standing to raise a claim of sex discrimina-
tion, from which she suffered only indirectly through her father who had failed to appeal
the dismissal of his own claim by a lower court, but that, if challenged by a party with
standing, the rule at issue would not "withstand[ ] heightened scrutiny." Id. at 450-51
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, for himself and Justice Thomas, opined that,
because only Congress and not the Court had the power to grant the requested remedy of
citizenship, scrutiny of any sort of the rules in question was beside the point. See id. at 452-
53 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, of the six justices who ruled against Miller, only two,
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justices explicitly agreed that if the sex-respecting rules at issue were
based on stereotypes, they would be unconstitutional. Five of those
justices also explicitly stated their opinion that the rules were indeed
based on impermissible stereotypes. Thus, if Congress and the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service heed Chief Justice Rehnquist's ad-
monition to take precedent to heart, even before the commencement
of litigation, they should read the collection of opinions as an injunc-
tion to alter the laws at issue, notwithstanding that Miller herself, for
procedural reasons, lost her case.
But what alteration in the law would produce equal protection in
this case? The answer is far from simple, either as a practical or as a
theoretical matter. As a practical matter, the laws bestowing U.S. citi-
zenship at birth to children only one of whose parents is a U.S. citizen
are quite complex, with the requirements depending, not only on
whether the citizen parent is the mother or the father as in Miller, but
on whether the parents are married to one another. Even if a major-
ity of the Court were to find standing in a Miller-like case, and also to
disagree with Justices Scalia and Thomas that granting citizenship in
such a case is within the Court's power, it would still be quite difficult
for a court surgically to alter the laws at issue so as to eliminate any
discrimination, without distorting the congressional scheme.' 5 5 Per-
haps this is one reason why Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, though
Justices Stevens and Rehnquist, needed to reach the merits of her claim to do so. In dis-
sent,Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, each of whom wrote an opinion in which the other and
Justice Souter joined, opined that the plaintiff had standing and the Court power to aid
her, and that the sex-respecting rules that denied her citizenship relied unconstitutionally
on stereotypes. See id. at 460 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting); id. at 471-72 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
155 Only a subset of the sex-distinctions in requirements for the transmission of citizen-
ship to nonmarital offspring were at issue in Miller, but a subsequent case may challenge
others that also may be difficult to justify under heightened scrutiny. The differences in-
clude: (1) differential U.S. residency requirements for the citizen parent of a child born
outside of the United States or its outlying possessions. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1994)
(requiring unmarried mothers to reside in the United States or one of its outlying posses-
sions for one year), and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994) (requiring both mothers and fathers
married to noncitizens to reside in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for
five years); (2) differential standards of proof of blood relationship, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409(a) (1) (1994) (requiring proof by "clear and convincing evidence" for fathers only);
and (3) requirements that apply only to fathers, see 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (a) (1994) (requiring
that the father agree "in writing to provide financial support for the [child] until the
[child] reaches the age of 18 years," and that the paternity of the child is either legiti-
mated, acknowledged "in writing under oath," or adjudciated by a competent court).
Eliminating all discrimination between citizen mothers and fathers of foreign born
nonmarital children by imposing on citizen mothers the additional requirements imposed
on fathers would deprive of citizenship many children on whom Congress intended to
bestow citizenship, some of whom would as a result of such deprivation become stateless.
Generously reducing the requirements on fathers to those the current law imposes on
mothers also poses problems, however. For example, it would categorically favor
nonmarital over marital children with one citizen parent, something unlikely to be en-
dorsed by Congress.
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denying Miller herself standing, went on in dicta to express their
doubts as to constitutionality. They may have been signalling Con-
gress and the State Department to get busy drafting before a plaintiff
with standing came to court.
Congress could, of course, solve the Miller problem by requiring
of all offspring of only one citizen parent of either sex or marital sta-
tus, merely proof of parental relationship, coupled with some uniform
and minimal period of parental residence in the United States. 156
This would be a generous, straightforward and perhaps even just re-
sult. Rather than responding with aversion to the spectre of invasion
by the scattered seed of American service men, which seemed to
haunt at least Justice Stevens,' 57 perhaps we as a nation should wel-
come and take responsibility for them.'58 If Congress remains disin-
clined to be so generous with citizenship, solving the problems raised
by Miller will not be easy.
Squarely facing the question of remedy in Miller might cause the
Court and legislators who respond to it to realize how poorly each has
thought through the issues presented by earlier cases concerning men
and women as mothers and fathers, in particular of illegitimate chil-
dren. Commentators who have tried to make sense of the Court's
pronouncements in this area and the legislative responses thereto ad-
mit defeat. 59 It would be beyond the scope of this Article for me to
make another such attempt. A few observations should be made, how-
ever. First, of the two main branches of the Court's illegitimacy cases,
one involving sex discrimination in the treatment of mothers and fa-
thers of illegitimates, the other involving distinctions made on the ba-
sis of illegitimacy, the issue in Miller comes closer to those in the latter
branch. Citizenship bears a certain resemblance to an inheritance:
156 Alternatively, a continued distinction between the one year residence required of
mothers and five of everyone else could be justified by reference over to another rule, that
of certain other countries which, by making citizenship of nonmarital children dependent
on the citizenship of their mothers, might leave stateless such children of American
mothers to whom the United States denied citizenship. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alex-
ander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power. Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Mak-
ing in Miller v. Albright, 1998 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
157 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 438-39.
158 In an intriguing paper on the implications of Miller, Alex Aleinikoff and Cornelia
Pillard point out that "[a]llowing U.S. fathers to elect not to convey citizenship [on chil-
dren they conceive abroad has] ugly class and race implications." Pillard & Aleinikoff,
supra note 156, at 24 n.92.
159 For example, a leading family law treatise, HoMER CLARK, THE LAw OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1988), says of "the constitutional position of the
father of an illegitimate child," id at 855, that "[i]t is difficult if not impossible to arrive at
an accurate or useful assessment of the Supreme Court's decisions [in this area]," id. at
860, and "[m]any criticisms and questions can be directed to the Stanley opinion," id. at
856, and "[t]he Supreme Court has attempted on four subsequent occasions to clarify
some of the issues raised by the Stanley case, but has succeeded only in compounding the
confusion." Id. at 856-58.
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the question is not one of zero-sum competition between males and
females as mothers and fathers, but of the ability of each to transmit
benefits to and to gain them through their children. As in cases of
inheritance and wrongful death, where, mutatis mutandis, both par-
ents and children could claim benefits through one another, and
rights claimed through a child could redound to the benefit of the
other parent, so with citizenship. Just as the worker's compensation
benefits in Weber v. Aetna Casualty,160 the disability benefits inJimenez v.
Weinberger,'6 ' and the inheritance in Trimb/e v. Gordon' 62-claimed by
illegitimate minor children through their deceased father-would
have assisted their mother financially, so the U.S. citizenship a child
claims through one parent may assist her other, alien parent, to ob-
tain preferential U.S. immigration status through the child. Also,
there is a similar willingness to allow some choice about transmission:
for both citizenship and inheritance, shirking fathers can disqualify
their offspring out of benefits by failing to formalize relationships by
legitimation, will, or written agreement. The question is also gener-
ally more straightforwardly one of biological and legal relationship,
not of attachment. 63 AsJustice Harlan insisted in his dissent in Glona
v. American Guarantee,'6 the statutory scheme, there of wrongful
death, here of citizenship transmission, "generally defined classes of
proper plaintiffs by highly arbitrary lines based on family relation-
ships, excluding issues concerning the actual effect" of family mem-
bers on each others' lives. 165 Justice Harlan added: "[I]t does not
matter who loved or depended on whom .... mak[ing] everything the
Court says about affection and nurture and dependence altogether
irrelevant. The only question in any case is whether the plaintiff falls
within the class of persons to whom the State has accorded a right of
action."166
It is unhelpful for the Miller dissenters to insist that the statute's
problem can be solved by "distinguish[ing] between caretaker and
160 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
161 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
162 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
163 Consider, for example, how, if at all, the analysis would have been different, if
instead of Lorelynn Miller, the plaintiff in the Supreme Court citizenship case had been
Luzvisaminda Ablang, also the daughter of a Phillippine woman and a U.S. citizen-soldier-
father, but one whose "mother gave her shortly after birth to another family, which raised
but never legally adopted her. Ablang was unaware of her true parentage until her natural
mother came to see her some time after her graduation from high school. Her mother
informed her that her father was a United States citizen...." Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801,
802 (9th Cir. 1995) (denying Ablang citizenship on the basis of the statute at issue in
Miller).
164 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (expanding wrongful death actions to include suits by the
mother of a deceased illegitimate child).
165 Id. at 77 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 78-79 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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non-caretaker parents, rather than between men and women. 1 67
What is called for is an easily administered bright line requirement,
and again, the requirement need not be competitive between parents.
What does Justice Breyer envision, that immigration officials take testi-
mony about who changed a child's diapers?168 At what point in time,
if citizenship can be claimed at any point from birth through adult-
hood? And how often? Should divorced citizen parents no longer be
able to transmit citizenship if they do not get custody or pay child
support? Should citizenship transmitted to an infant through a care-
taker parent be revocable in the event the bulk of the caretaking shifts
to the alien parent? Can a parent who does not live day-to-day with
the child ever qualify as a caretaker for citizenship-transmittal pur-
poses? Can mere financial contribution, however substantial and reli-
able, qualify as caretaking? How about financial support combined
with shared residence? Or combined with regular visits, letters, and
phone calls? These questions are far too complicated to administer,
and unnecessary for citizenship, because generosity to fathers does
not hurt mothers and probably not the polity either.
A different set of questions is raised in the main context in which
the Court earlier faced sex distinctions between nonmarital fathers
and mothers-adoption and custody of children. If the rule in Miller
is unconstitutional for the reasons suggested by the dissenters, then
there is reason to think, for example, that most states have not ade-
quately solved the constitutional problems with their adoption stat-
utes, because, to me at least, the sex distinctions a majority of the
Court found problematic in Miller look very close to a state's good
faith response to the Stanley/Caban/Quilloin/Lehr line of cases, hold-
ing that the rights nonmarital fathers must receive are a function of
the extent to which those fathers have seized their unique opportunity
to invest in their children.' 69
One way of analyzing the remedy in Miller and other cases involv-
ing men and women as mothers and fathers is analogous to affirma-
167 Milkr, 523 U.S. at 487 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
168 Of course, as Professor Martha Fineman pointed out to me, such intrusive ques-
tions in aid of amorphous standards would not be new to those controlling access to the
United States. Compare the requirement that a marriage between a citizen and an alien,
in order to advance the alien's immigration, must be more than legally binding, it must be
"valid." See 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (1994).
169 For example, New York's Domestic Relations Law, see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111
(McKinney 1999), specifies who must consent to adoption of a child, with respect to chil-
dren born out of wedlock. Like the statute at issues in Miller, this statute now gives rights to
mothers categorically and unconditionally which it gives to fathers only to the extent that
they have taken one or more specified steps to evince commitment to the child. Compare
id. §111(c) with id. § 111(d). If such a distinction is to be seen as unconstitutional in the
context of citizenship, its continuing viability in the adoption context requires further
justification.
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tive action cases. Assuming that, as Justice Ginsburg stated in VM_,
both "[plhysical differences between men and women... [that] are
enduring"170 and affirmative action 7 can be acceptable reasons for
sex-respecting rules, it does not seem to follow that this justifies any
and every sex-respecting rule claimed to be premised on either of
these bases. Just as, therefore, a claim of affirmative action was not
enough to justify an all-female nursing school at Mississippi University,
so physical difference may not be enough to justify the diverse re-
quirements imposed on citizen mothers and fathers by the statutes in
Miller. Note, I am not arguing that any preference for mothers is af-
firmative action, just that there are similar questions as to fit once the
threshhold question of difference has been answered.
Another way of looking at the remedy phase in Milleris as a neces-
sary application of the doctrine of separate but equal. If men and
women are not quite similarly situated with respect to their children,
at least at birth, how do you treat "unalikes" equally? An insistence
that pregnancy is unique is no help here, since, that granted, the ques-
tions begin-some regime must be established for both mothers and
fathers, and, unless pregnancy is to count for nothing (as it would in a
scheme based simply on the fact of blood relationship), or to count
for everything (with no father's rights at all), its uniqueness is ques-
tion begging. What then should be set aside pregnancy in establish-
ing requirements for rights flowing from fatherhood? Note that the
normative framework looks very different if we are talking about fa-
thers' rights, fathers' obligations (e.g., children's rights vis a vis their
fathers), or third party rights flowing from the fact of fatherhood to
both fathers and children. It also matters whether the statutory
scheme is zero sum, as it most clearly is when fathers are in competi-
tion with mothers, for example, for custody or control over adoption,
as in cases like Caban v. Mohammed.'7 2 At least as applied, most of the
benefit scheme cases also have a zero sum potential. After all, if the
illegitimate child (or its father or mother) does not inherit or bring a
wrongful death action, or collect workers' compensation, someone
else likely will; even if no one does, the state gets the estate, and the
tortfeasor or the employer or the fund keeps the money. Citizenship
is really the only infinitely expandable benefit at issue in these cases.
170 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
171 "Sex classifications may be used to compensate women 'for particular economic
disabilities [they have] suffered.'" Id.
172 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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B. Sex Discrimination in Education: VMI, The Citadel, and the
Harlem Girls' School
Many of the most interesting open questions in the constitutional
law of sex discrimination involve education. Consider three concrete
questions. The first two involve the application of the VMgdecision to
the parties at whom it was directed, VMI and the Citadel, each of
which has chosen a different path to implementing the integration of
women. The Citadel, in line with the predictions of all parties and
courts in the VMJ litigation, made modifications for women in its
grooming codes and physical fitness requirements, as well as some of
its hazing rituals and restrictions on personal privacy. 173 All of these
modifications are sex-respecting rules and hence subject to height-
ened scrutiny if challenged, for example, by a male cadet who wishes
to grow longer hair, have more privacy, exhibit less upper body
strength, and be treated more civilly. Indeed, the rules are also sub-
ject to challenge by a female cadet who-if reports about the treat-
ment of two women who withdrew are accurate'4--could claim that
the modifications stigmatized her as a second class citizen-soldier and
impeded her chances for success.
VMI, by contrast, modified none of its fitness standards for wo-
men. It modified its grooming standards for new cadets or "rats,"17
only to the extent of adding a uniform skirt and giving the women a
haircut slightly longer than their male classmates, but in line with
those of upperclass men. 7 6 To accommodate personal privacy for fe-
male cadets, VMI made minimal changes in bathroom architecture. 177
173 These modifications are somewhat difficult to square with the phrase officials of
the Citadel repeatedly used in conversations with me to describe their approach to the
arrival of women: "Assimilation, not integration, and certainly not accommodation." I take
this motto to signify the Citadel's desire to change nothing on account of the arrival of
women. It is the women who must assimilate to the Citadel's existing masculine culture.
Integration would signify a single standard formed through modification of the rules for
both women and men. At present, the Citadel seems to exhibit the worst combination of
some unsystematic and half-hearted accommodation with repudiation of any commitent to
accommodation.
174 It is reported that the harassment of the women intensified when they were ex-
cused from carrying heavy loads because of injuries. Personal communications with
Valorie Vojdik, attorney for Shannon Faulkner. The women also, contrary to the regula-
tion for women, had their heads shaved. Id. It is unclear whether this was imposed on
them by harassers or if they did it voluntarily in an effort to fit in. Id.
175 Upperclass women at VMI will be subject to sex-specific makeup, hair, and jewelry
regulations designed, according to administrators, to obviate the risk that its female cadets
will be mistaken for males. See Peter Finn, Metro Making Room for a New Breed of Rat: VMT
Leaders Say School is Ready for First Women, WAsH. PosT, July 27, 1997, at 88.
176 See id.
177 See id. Among the few across the board changes made coincident with the admis-
sion of women are privacy fostering rules regarding attire in public spaces in the barracks,
screening of windows on cadets' rooms, and restrictions on the previously unhindered
ability of upperclassmen to enter rats' rooms unannounced. See id.
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Except for these changes in grooming and architecture,17 8 VMI's
treatment of cadets will not be sex respecting, and can be challenged
as discriminatory only to the extent that it has a disparate impact on
women and was adopted or maintained because of, and not merely in
spite of, this disparate impact. Given that VMI spent years in litigation
denying that women could be admitted without massive changes to
the requirements imposed on cadets, and that it announced its deci-
sion on unchanged standards only after the start of an academic year
for which, notwithstanding the Court's order, it had taken no visible
steps to admit women,179 there is some chance the requirements of
unconstitutional disparate impact have been met. The litigation his-
tory might be evidence that VMI's motive is an exclusionary, not an
egalitarian one.180 Nevertheless, there is no blinking the fact that, of
178 I do not mean to minimize the effect of these differences. I have been an accred-
ited observer at VMI for many of the major events in the integration of women, and I can
testify from experience that the very slight difference in hair length is the single most
reliable way of distinguishing male from female rats. Breasts and hips-to-waist ratio are
effectively hidden by fatigues, and many male cadets are as slight and delicate looking as
women. If a press photographer's rule is "look for hair" in singling out female rats, a
quarter-inch in length makes a world of difference. In my view, VMI was wrong to abandon
its intermediate plan of returning the hair length for all rats to one slightly longer than
recently permitted, but consistent with uniform rules in past decades.
As for changes to accommodate privacy, these include individualized, curtained
shower stalls for female cadets, but none for the men. When I questioned thejustification
for this distinction, I was told by the male cadet taking me on tour that the women's show-
ers had been so constructed for "health reasons." Neither I, nor the physicians I have
consulted, have any idea what these health reasons might be; the cadet did not know
either. But the vague look of horror in his eyes as he said this suggested to me that for the
men of VMI, the bodies of women still were a contaminant, infested with cooties, somehow
mysteriously unclean.
179 Administrators at VMI insist that behind the scenes they were frantically preparing
for women, even as its Board was openly discussing the option of going private instead.
180 I should disclose that in a debate at UVA sponsored by the Federalist Society with
VMI's counsel Ted Olson, while the case was sub judice before the Court, I asked Olson
what VMI was afraid of and told him the following:
What I don't understand is why VMI doesn't simply say nothing will change.
We will admit women, and any woman who is foolish enough to want to and
strong enough to be able to do everything we have required of men thus
far, we'll let in. No privacy--she goes to the bathroom with, she showers
with, she does push-ups with all those men. If she has to do it, fine. Why
not at least give her that chance? Why must everything change? Except for
archaic and stereotypical reasons about the way the sexes ought to behave
to one another. Possibly few women will be able to do it, I don't know so
much. It's not clear that many men at the moment do it.... If you're male
you get in whether you have the physical abilities required or not. The
District Court established that 15% of women in the applicant pool can pass
the physical fitness test, 50% of the incoming class at VMI cannot, 2% grad-
uate without ever having met those physical requirements. The only physi-
cal requirement seems to be that you have male genitalia.
Federalist Society Debate, Univ. of Va., April 1996. If VMI had promptly responded to the
Hogan decision, as ChiefJustice Rehnquist urged, or even to the filing of a lawsuit against
them, by admitting women without changing their requirements, I would have supported
them, as few other feminists would. I do not think this estops me from claiming that de-
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the two potential lawsuits, the one challenging the Citadel's effort to
accommodate women has a far better chance of success. This is fur-
ther evidence of the law's troubling blindness to discrimination
caused by anything other than a sex-respecting rule.
As for the Harlem Girls' School, officially known as the Young
Women's Leadership Academy, as I understand the facts, its exclusion
of boys is de facto, not dejure. The school has announced its willing-
ness to accept applications from boys, but no boy has yet applied, nor
has any organization interested in filing a legal challenge to the
school yet found a boy willing to serve as the named plaintiff. The
school's case is therefore interesting to me less as a case of sex discrim-
ination than of gender discrimination. The lack of interest on the
part of boys is yet one more example of the phenomenon of the deval-
uing of women and all that is associated with them, i.e., as coded femi-
nine.181 Will the presence of even a single boy cause a tipping point
in the Harlem Girls' School? I leave that to the educational theorists,
but I predict that as a legal matter, so long as his exclusion is not de
jure, explicitly sex-respecting rules may not be at issue, and courts will
be correspondingly hesitant to interfere. 182
C. Same Sex Marriage and the Defense of Marriage Act as a
Sex-Respecting Rule
Bans on same sex marriage, and indeed most other discrimina-
tion against homosexuals, including criminal laws proscribing only
homosexual sodomy, have all the formal structure of a discrimination
on the basis of sex in that, but for a gay person's sex, his or her treat-
ment by the law would be different. This has been clear to gay rights
cades after Hogan, years after litigation commenced and was defended by VMI with relent-
less insistence on the need for a change in standards, and months after the Supreme Court
ordered the admission of women having accepted VMI's insistence that change would be
required, VMI could be estopped from its plan of minimal change. Forjust such behavior
as VMI's was the constitutional disparate-impact standard developed. Under that standard,
the very same rule deemed acceptable when done for acceptable motives becomes uncon-
stitutional when the motives are as pernicious as VMI's could have been seen to be in this
instance.
181 Just as boys do not want to attend a girls' school, they do not, for example, want to
watch Saturday morning cartoons or play video games featuring predominantly female
characters. They are afraid of cooties. In the case of cartoon characters, as with so much
of contemporary culture, males devalue the feminine while females accept the masculine.
The result on Saturday mornings has reportedly been a severe limitation on female charac-
ters, reminiscent of the avoidance of "tipping points" in racial integration.
182 An instructive analogy may be the Detroit Male Academy, whose de jure all-male
character was struck down in Garrett v. Board of Education, 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich.
1991). Although the Academy's mission was to educate African-American boys, it appears
that it never needed to exclude whites dejure, because of the overwhelming percentage of
minority youth in the relevant school system. See id. at 1005, 1014. In any event, only its
exclusion of women was challenged in court. See id. at 1005-06.
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litigators for decades, 183 but has only recently gained acceptance by a
court: the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin'84 held it to be
discrimination on the basis of sex of the sort that, under the Hawaii
Constitution, could only be upheld if narrowly tailored to serve a com-
pelling state interest, for Hawaii to deny same-sex couples entry into
marriage. 185 Inevitably after Baehr, further challenges to sex-respect-
ing rules of marriage, under the federal as well as state constitutions,
will follow. The only purportedly compelling justifications offered on
remand in Baehrwere based on stereotypes and were, as such, rejected
by the lower court.18 6 Though that court did not use the language of
stereotyping or imperfect proxy, but rather the more conventional
strict scrutiny language of narrow tailoring to a compelling state inter-
est,187 the fact remains that the lower court relied on exceptions to
the state's asumptions in rejecting them as an acceptable basis for the
law.188 The state insisted that denying marriage to gays and lesbians
promoted the "compelling interest in protecting the health and wel-
fare of children."1 9 In rejecting any "causal link between allowing
same-sex marriage and adverse effects upon the optimal development
of children,"' 90 the trial court relied on evidence from even Hawaii's
own expert witnesses that there were gay and lesbian parents who pro-
vided good homes for children; heterosexual, married, biological par-
ents who did not; as well as, more broadly, a diversity in functioning
family structure. 191 In other words, being a male-female couple was
an imperfect proxy for being a good parent.
183 See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 608 F.2d 327, 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1979)
(unsuccessfully arguing, inter alia, that (1) to treat, for example, a male who prefers male
sexual partners differently from a female who prefers male partners was to use different
employment criteria for men and women, something Title VII prohibits and (2) given that
discrimination against those who associated with blacks had been held to violate Title VII,
"analogously discrimination because of the sex of the employees' sexual partner should
constitute discrimination based on sex"); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1974), review denied 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974) (unsuccessfully arguing on the basis of
Washington's Equal Rights Amendment that "to permit a man to marry a woman but at the
same time to deny him the right to marry another man is to construct an unconstitutional
classification 'on account of sex'").
184 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
185 See id. at 63-64.
186 SeeBaehrv. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct., Dec. 3,
1996). The only compelling state interest on which the state offered evidence on remand
was the interest in promoting the well-being of children who, it claimed, were best off
when raised by both of their biological parents in a marital household. See id. at *3. The
State failed miserably in this proof, with its own witnesses testifying that gay and lesbian
couples can make excellent parents. See id. at *7.
187 See id. at *21.
188 See id.
189 Id. at *3.
190 Id. at *18.
191 See id. at *17. The court explained:
20001 1487
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
More broadly, prohibitions on homosexuality rely on stereotypes
in the sense that they are based on "fixed notions concerning the
roles and abilities of men and women."192 These notions have some
subordinating taint, in that among their normative premises are that
women should not be free of men and that men should not behave
sexually as women do-receptively in anal intercourse or fellatio.193
Thus, both for the social and the sexual role division in marriage, re-
quiring one of each sex for a marriage is stereotypical.' 94 Legally en-
forced role differentiation in marriage was ruled out of bounds in
cases like Orr v. Orr 95 and Stanton v. Stanton.196 Since it is no longer
the case that in marriage he pays, she serves, why not take Sylvia Law's
point about the anti-stereotyping impact of having two men or two
women divide up these roles-either equally and symmetrically, or, at
least for one of them in a same-sex couple, counter to the predictive
and normative stereotype' 97 associated with his or her sex?198
A father and a mother can, and do, provide his or her child with unique
paternal and maternal contributions which are important, though not es-
sential, to the development of a happy, healthy, well-adjusted child....
However, there is diversity in the structure and configuration of families.
In Hawaii, and elsewhere, children are being raised by their natural par-
ents, single parents, step-parents, grandparents, adopted parents, hanai
parents, foster parents, gay and lesbian parents, and same-sex couples....
There also are families in Hawaii, and elsewhere, which do not have chil-
dren as family members.... The evidence presented by Plaintiffs and De-
fendants establishes that the single most important factor in the
development of a happy, healthy, well-adjusted child is the nurturing rela-
tionship btween parent and child.... The sexual orientation of parents is
not in and of itself an indicator of parental fitness.... Gay and lesbian
parents and same-sex couples can be as fit and loving parents, as non-gay
men and women and different-sex couples.
Id.
192 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
193 To the extent that disfavoring of homosexuality is tied to the disfavoring of mascu-
line behavior by women and effeminacy in men or of sexually agressive behavior in women
and sexually receptive behavior in men, it is based on stereotypes (in the sense of imper-
fect proxies) of gay life: it is both over and underinclusive in that not all effeminate men
are gay or gay men effeminate, not all masculine women are lesbian nor all lesbians butch.
194 Consider the defense of role modeling for children-some case law suggests in the
employment context that this cannot amount to a BFOQ and why, pace Pat Buchanan,
can't you have a female role model if you're a male? Nation Briefs: Buchanan's Role Models
Are All Men, CHi. SUN-TuMES, Aug. 21, 1995, at 18.
195 440 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1979) (striking down Alabama statute providing alimony on
divorce only to wives, never husbands, on the grounds that the state's purpose of reinforc-
ing the model of "allocation of family responsibilities under which the wife plays a depen-
dent role" could not "justify a statute that discriminates on the basis of gender").
196 421 U.S. 7, 13-15 (1975) (striking down differential ages of majority for child sup-
port and education since "[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and the
rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas").
197 I use stereotype here in the sense of an archaic normative template for a given sex,
as well as an imperfect descriptive proxy.
198 See Law, supra note 130, at 232.
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One way of making the law of marriage neither sex-respecting
nor useable by same sex couples might be to make the ability to en-
gage in vaginal intercourse with one's marital partner a condition for
entry into marriage. Marriage can thus be seen as a license to engage
in vaginal intercourse. For centuries this was the law of marriage in
most of the Western world, with impotence in men and vaginal ob-
struction in women, if existing at the time of marriage, a ground for
annullment. Capacity for vaginal intercourse in marriage law is like
capacity for pregnancy in Geduldig, it is strongly, indeed almost defini-
tionally, sex-linked,199 but on the other hand, not, as a formal matter,
dividing the world into classes by sex. Ultimately, however, the diffi-
culty with any such attempt to avoid a sex-discriminatory law of mar-
riage, while still excluding same-sex couples, is that state laws no
longer confine access to marriage to those capable of vaginal inter-
course, as they do not confine it to fertile couples, 200 and it is quite
doubtful that such a restriction would survive a substantive due pro-
cess challenge by a man and woman.201
As the Hawaii Supreme Court in its Baehr v. Lewin opinion may
well have realized, to strike down a ban on same-sex marriage on
equal protection grounds as violative of norms against sex discrimina-
tion rather than on substantive due process grounds as violative of
guarantees of associational privacy and family autonomy, is in many
respects the more conservative, more easily limited decision. Not that
a sex discrimination holding could not have quite radical implica-
tions, but unisex bathrooms and women on football teams are both
less frightening, and more easily avoided, through distinction and ma-
nipulation of existing doctrine, than are polygamy or adult incest, the
proximate entrants in the parade of horribles posed by a privacy/sub-
stantive due process holding. A ruling that the constitutional basis for
same-sex marriages is a prohibition on sex discrimination gets Hawaii
same-sex marriages, but puts very little else at risk.
A federal constitutional challenge to sex-respecting rules gov-
erning marriage is inevitable, and one likely source is the Defense of
Marriage AcL202 Much attention has been paid to the question of the
199 See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 161-62 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (superseded by statute).
200 Note that the requirement of capacity for vaginal intercourse was probably used as
a proxy for fertility in eras when more direct evidence was difficult to obtain.
201 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1987) (holding "constitutionally infirm" a
Missouri regulation denying prisoners the ability to marry without permission from the
superintendent of the prison). For prisoners, the obstacle to intercourse is not simply
physiological incapacity, but the fact that one of the parties may be scheduled to spend the
remainder of his or her life in a prison that allows no full-contact visits. The Court acknowl-
edged the importance of marriages as "expressions of emotional support and public com-
mitment" with "spiritual significance." Id. at 95-96.
202 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996).
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constitutionality of the first portion of the Defense of Marriage Act,
concerning the full faith and credit implications of same-sex mar-
riage.203 Substantially less attention has been paid to the second half
of the Act, which provides that, "[i] n determining the meaning of any
[federal statute, regulation, or administrative ruling], the word 'mar-
riage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or wife. ' 204 This is, of course, a sex-
respecting rule, and hence subject to heightened scrutiny under
Supreme Court precedent.20 5 The fact pattern I see as presenting the
strongest challenge to the Act involves a heterosexual couple disad-
vantaged by the federal definition of marriage. To see how they could
be, it is important to remember that, under federal law, it is some-
times advantageous and often disadvantageous to be treated as mar-
ried. Not only does the Internal Revenue Code impose a so-called
"marriage penalty" on two-earner married couples, other federal stat-
utes often terminate benefits to those who marry (for example the
benefits due as the result of the death of a previous spouse). Thus,
especially if they are residents of a state that permits same-sex mar-
riage, a married couple who conforms to the federal definition may
be disadvantaged by comparison with a married same-sex couple from
their state. For the same-sex couple will be eligible for all the privi-
leges of marriage under state law and none of its burdens under fed-
eral law. Thus, a remarrying widow who loses her federal pension
when she acquires her new husband can claim that, but for her sex, or
that of her partner, she would be better off.
Questing for proxies, perfect or otherwise, strikes me as quite dif-
ficult in this scenario. On the other hand, it also seems to me difficult
to imagine what important governmental interest the sex-respecting
rule in the Defense of Marriage Act can be closely related to. I won-
der how many sex-respecting rules, other than that in the Defense of
Marriage Act, are left in the United States Code. And I'm hard pressed
to imagine what a reasoned opinion uphholding the Act could possi-
bly say.
CONCLUSION
I began this Article by asserting that, notwithstanding the fears of
its critics and the hopes of its fans, the VMcase was more like the end
of the line than it was some sort of new beginning for the constitu-
203 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exception, 106 YA.E LJ. 1965, 2000-07 (1997) (arguing that this portion of the
Act is unconstitutional).
204 Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a).
205 It also may have other constitutional problems unrelated to sex discrimination.
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tional law of sex discrimination. If this branch of law is indeed to have
a new begining, most of the plausible routes would involve what the
VMT case does not-a departure from precedent. One such new
route might be to apply an anti-subordination approach to the facts of
cases like Lanier. Still another approach would be to revitalize consti-
tutional disparate-impact doctrine, for example, by forcing a shift in
support from the masculinist practices of VMI to those of VWTL. A
third approach, advocated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his VMT con-
currence, but also by many committed feminists, might be to pay in-
creased attention to the possibilities of equality in difference,
something required by the parenting cases and imaginable in a wide
variety of other contexts. What these routes have in common is a shift
in emphasis from the problem of sex discrimination to the problem of
sex equality. By contrast, the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision to take
restrictions on same-sex marriage seriously, as a problem of sex dis-
crimination, shows that a new beginning is also possible for a court
prepared to follow the old anti-stereotyping route past its comfort
zone to its logical conclusion.
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